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SHOULD STATES HAVE GREATER STANDING RIGHTS 
THAN ORDINARY CITIZENS?: MASSACHUSETTS V. EPA'S 
NEW STANDING TEST FOR STATES 
BRADFORD MANK* 
ABSTRACT 
In Massachusetts v. EPA, the Supreme Court for the first time 
clearly gave greater standing rights to states than ordinary citizens. 
The Court, however, failed to explain to what extent or when states 
are entitled to more lenient standing. This Article concludes that the 
Court has historically given states preferential status in federal 
courts when a state files a parens patriae suit based on the state's 
quasi-sovereign interest in the health and welfare of its citizens or the 
natural resources of its inhabitants and territory. A quasi-sovereign 
interest is inherently less concrete and particularized than the types 
of injuries that individual citizens need for standing, yet the Court 
has allowed states standing to protect their general interest in their 
citizens' health and welfare. This Article proposes that courts relax 
the immediacy and redressability prongs of the standing test when 
states bring parens patriae suits to protect their quasi-sovereign 
interest in the health, welfare, and natural resources of their citizens. 
This proposed standing test would be similar to the relaxed standing 
test for procedural rights plaintiffs but is based on the Court's 
historic parens patriae decisions. By using and refining the Court's 
procedural rights standing test as a model, this Article proposes a 
workable standing test for states. 
* James Helmer, Jr., Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati College of Law, P.O. Box 
210040, University of Cincinnati, Cincinnati, Ohio 45221·0040; Tel: 513·556·0094; Fax 513· 
556·1236; E·mail: brad.mank@uc.edu. I thank Michael Solimine for his comments and my 
faculty for their comments at a summer workshop. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In Massachusetts v. EPA,! the Supreme Court held that carbon 
dioxide (COJ and other greenhouse gases (GHGs) are air pollutants 
within the meaning of the Clean Air Act (CAA).2 The Court 
determined that the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
has a presumptive statutory duty under the Act to issue regulations 
for emissions of GHGs from new motor vehicles and remanded the 
case so that the EPA can reconsider its denial of a petition to 
regulate GHGs from new vehicles.3 Although its decision on the 
merits is important, the Court's conclusion that Massachusetts had 
standing to file suit because states are entitled to more lenient 
standing criteria may have a greater impact in the long-term on 
legal doctrine.4 In Massachusetts, the Supreme Court clearly gave, 
for the first time, greater standing rights to states than ordinary 
citizens.5 The Court, however, failed to explain to what extent or 
when states are entitled to more lenient standing. This Article 
proposes that courts relax the immediacy and redressability prongs 
of the standing test when states bring parens patriae suits to 
protect their quasi-sovereign interest in the health, welfare, and 
1. 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007). 
2. Id. at 1462. See generally Clean Air Act (CAA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671 (2000). 
3. See Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1459-60, 1463; Jonathan H. Adler, Warming Up to 
Climate Change Litigation, 93 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 63, 69-70 (2007), available at 
http://www.virginialawreview.org/inbriefl2007/05/211adler.pdf; Dru Stevenson, Special 
Solicitude for State Standing: Massachusetts v. EPA, 112 PENN ST. L. REV. 1,2(2007). 
4. See Adler, supra note 3, at 63-69; Stevenson, supra note 3, at 4-5; Kathryn A. Watts 
& Amy J. Wildermuth, Massachusetts v. EPA: Breaking New Ground on Issues Other than 
Global Warming, 102 Nw. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2008) (manuscript at 2), available at 
http://www.law.northwestern.edullawreview/Colloquy/2007/17ILRColl2007n17Watts.pdf("We 
believe that the long-term significance of the case is likely to be the opinion's impact on two 
doctrinal areas of the law: (1) the standing of states; and (2) the standard of review applied 
to denials of petitions for rulemaking."). 
5. See Adler, supra note 3, at 64 ("Although many assumed the Court would focus on the 
specific claims of standing put forward by Massachusetts, few expected the Court to announce 
a new rule for state standing in lawsuits brought against the federal government."); see also 
Thomas W. Merrill, Global Warming as a Public Nuisance, 30 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 293, 304 
(2005) (''What the Court has not made clear is whether State AGs who bring parens patriae 
public nuisance suits in federal court are subject to the same standing rules as apply to citizen 
suits, or whether they are exempt from such limitations by analogy to public actions filed by 
public officers in the courts of their own sovereign."). 
HeinOnline -- 49 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1705 2007-2008
2008] NEW STANDING TEST FOR STATES 1705 
natural resources of their citizens.6 This proposed standing test 
would be similar to the relaxed standing test for procedural rights 
plaintiffs but is based on the Court's historic parens patriae 
decisions.7 
In Massachusetts, twelve states, with Massachusetts as lead 
petitioner, joined other plaintiffs in challenging the EPA's denial of 
a petition to regulate GHGs from new vehicle emissions on the 
grounds that the EPA lacked authority under the Act to regulate 
those gases.8 Before reaching the question of whether the EPA had 
statutory authority to regulate GHGs, the Court had to first decide 
the difficult issue of whether the petitioners had standing. The 
Constitution does not by its terms require that a plaintiff have 
standing to file suit in federal court, but since 1944 the Supreme 
Court has explicitly imposed standing requirements that it has 
inferred from Article Ill's limitation of judicial decisions to cases 
and controversies to ensure that the plaintiff has a genuine interest 
and stake in a case.9 Because GHGs from vehicles or other sources 
6. See infra Part V. 
7. See infra Part V. 
8. Twelve states were allied as petitioners: California, Connecticut, Illinois, Maine, 
Massachusetts, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, and 
Washington. Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1446 n.2. Ten states intervened on the side of the 
EPA: Alaska, Idaho, Kansas, Michigan, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, South Dakota, Texas, 
and Utah. Id. at 1446 n.5. Six states filed briefs as amici curiae in support of the petitioner 
states: Arizona, Delaware, Iowa, Maryland, Minnesota, and Wisconsin. Stevenson, supra note 
3, at 3 n.6. 
9. U.S. CONST. art. III (limiting the federal judiciary's power to "cases" or 
"controversies"); DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 340-42 (2006) (explaining why 
the Supreme Court infers that Article Ill's case or controversy requirement necessitates 
standing limitations); Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. I, 11 (2004) ("Article 
III standing ... enforces the Constitution's case-or-controversy requirement .... "); Stark v. 
Wickard, 321 U.S. 288, 304, 310 (1944) (first Supreme Court case explicitly stating Article III 
standing requirements); Ryan Guilds, Comment, A Jurisprudence of Doubt: Generalized 
Grievances as a Limitation to Federal Court Access, 74 N.C. L. REV. 1863, 1868 (1996); see 
Bradford C. Mank, Standing and Global Warming: Is Injury to All Injury to None?, 35 ENVTL. 
L. I, 22 (2005) (noting that since 1944 the Supreme Court has interpreted Article III to 
require plaintiffs to satisfy standing criteria). But see Cass R. Sunstein, What's Standing After 
Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, "Injuries," and Article III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 168-79 (1992) 
(arguing the Framers of the Constitution did not intend that Article III would require 
standing). In its 1923 decision, Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923), the Supreme 
Court refused to allow a suit by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts under the parens 
patriae doctrine to challenge a federal appropriations act because it was a political issue and 
thus not judicially cognizable under Article III. Id. at 484-85; see also DAVID P. CURRIE, THE 
CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE SECOND CENTURY 1888-1986, at 184 (1990). The 
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have global rather than localized impacts, there are serious 
questions about whether any individual has sufficiently unique 
harms to justify standing. 10 
In his majority opinion, Justice Stevens, who was joined by 
Justices Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, "stress[ed] ... the 
special position and interest ofMassachusetts."ll He stated that "[i]t 
is of considerable relevance that the party seeking review here is a 
sovereign State and not ... a private individual."12 Justice Stevens 
contended that the Court, in its 1907 decision in Georgia u. 
Tennessee Copper Co./3 "recognized that States are not normal 
litigants for the purposes of invoking federal jurisdiction."14 In 
Tennessee Copper and several other cases, the Court recognized a 
special standing doctrine of parens patriae standing to allow states 
to protect certain quasi-sovereign interests including the health, 
welfare, or natural resources of their citizens. 15 Just as Georgia had 
a right to invoke federal jurisdiction to protect its quasi-sovereign 
interest in protecting the health of its citizens from air pollution 
emanating from another state, Justice Stevens maintained that 
''Massachusetts' well-founded desire to preserve its sovereign 
territory today" gave it standing to invoke federal jurisdiction. 16 
In light of both its statutory right to petition the EPA and 
''Massachusetts' stake in protecting its quasi-sovereign interests," 
Justice Stevens concluded that "the Commonwealth is entitled to 
Mellon Court also refused to allow taxpayers to challenge the act because 
[tJhe party who invokes the power must be able to show not only that the statute 
is invalid but that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining 
some direct injury as the result of its enforcement, and not merely that he 
suffers in some indefinite way in common with people generally. 
262 U.S. at 488; see also CURRIE, supra, at 184. Mellon implied standing requirements, but 
never explicitly used the term. See CURRIE, supra, at 183·86. 
10. See infra Part III.C.3. Compare Mank, supra note 9 (arguing that at least some 
individuals have standing to challenge injuries from global warming, but acknowledging that 
standing for global phenomena raises complex standing issues), with Blake R. Bertagna, 
Comment, "Standing" Up for the Environment: The Ability of Plaintiffs To Establish Legal 
Standing To Redress Injuries Caused by Global Warming, 2006 BYU L. REV. 415, 444·46 
(arguing that plaintiffs asserting global warming claims fail to meet standing requirements). 
11. Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1454. 
12.Id. 
13. 206 U.S. 230 (1907). 
14. Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1454. 
15.Id. 
16.Id. 
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special solicitude in our standing analysis.,,17 Because only one 
petitioner needed to have standing for the case to go forward on 
the merits, the Court concluded that the Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts' allegations that increasing levels of GHGs from 
vehicles were causing rising sea levels that were damaging its 
coastline was sufficient to meet standing requirements. IS The Court 
did not clearly explain whether Massachusetts could have met 
normal standing criteria or needed to rely on the special standing 
criteria for states.19 
In his dissenting opinion, Chief Justice Roberts, who was joined 
by Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito, criticized the majority for 
relaxing standing requirements for states because he argued that 
there was no basis in the Court's precedent for applying a more 
lenient standard for states.20 He maintained that, in Tennessee 
Copper the Court treated states differently from private individuals 
with regard to available remedies, but that the case did not address 
Article III standing.21 Chief Justice Roberts acknowledged that the 
Court had recognized the doctrine of parens patriae standing to 
permit states to protect certain quasi-sovereign interests, but he 
contended that this type of standing requires a state to prove the 
additional requirement of having a quasi-sovereign interest and 
still requires the state to show that its citizens meet Article III 
standing.22 He argued that Massachusetts was not asserting a 
quasi-sovereign interest, but rather a "non sovereign interest" as the 
owner of coastal property.23 Further, he claimed that parens patriae 
standing is not allowed against the federal government.24 
Finally, Chief Justice Roberts contended that the majority applied 
a relaxed standing analysis because Massachusetts could not meet 
the three requirements for Article III standing: (1) injury in fact, (2) 
causation, and (3) redressability.25 He was especially concerned that 
17.Id. 
18. See id. at 1453-58. 
19. See infra Part III.C.3. 
20. Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1464 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
21. See id. at 1465. 
22. See id. at 1465-66. But see infra Parts III.B-C. 
23. See Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1466 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Alfred L. 
Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rei. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 601 (1982». 
24. See id. 
25. Id. at 1466-67. 
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the majority weakened precedent concerning causation and re-
dressability.26 He accused the majority of adopting weakened 
standing criteria that inappropriately allowed federal courts to hear 
complex policy disputes more appropriately addressed by the 
political branches of government.27 
This Article concludes that the Court has historically given states 
preferential status in federal courts when a state files a parens 
patriae suit based on the state's quasi-sovereign interest in the 
health and welfare of its citizens or the natural resources of its 
inhabitants and territory.28 There are sound reasons to apply lesser 
standing requirements to enable states to protect their quasi-
sovereign interest in the health and welfare of their citizens or the 
natural resources of their inhabitants and territory. Chief Justice 
Roberts' dissenting opinion is correct on many details, but fails to 
understand that the theoretical grounds for parens patriae standing 
also support a more relaxed standing test for states.29 A quasi-
sovereign interest is inherently less concrete and particularized 
than the type of injuries that individual citizens need for standing,30 
yet the Court has allowed states standing to protect their general 
interest in their citizens' health and welfare.31 Although it is not 
technically a standing case, Tennessee Copper is based on the 
fundamental distinction that states have different and greater 
rights than individual citizens.32 Thus, the Massachusetts majority 
correctly used the Court's parens patriae decisions as the basis for 
giving states preferential access to federal courts even though none 
of the parens patriae cases explicitly applied a lower standing 
threshold for states. 
26. See id. at 1468-70; Adler, supra note 3, at 66,69. 
27. Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1464, 1470-71. 
28. See infra Part IV.G. 
29. See infra notes 349-52 and accompanying text. 
30. For standing in an Article III court, the Court currently requires a plaintiff to show: 
(1) [she] has suffered "an injury in fact" that is (a) concrete and particularized 
and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) the injury is 
fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant; and (3) it is likely, as 
opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable 
decision. 
Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180-81 (2000). 
31. See, e.g., Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237-38 (1907). 
32. [d. 
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The most serious weakness of the majority opinion is that it fails 
to define to what extent and under what circumstances federal 
courts should relax standing requirements for states.33 The Court 
currently relaxes the immediacy and redressability portions of the 
standing test for procedural rights plaintiffs.34 The Tennessee 
Copper decision and other parens patriae cases justify a similar 
relaxation of the immediacy and redressability requirements for 
states filing parens patriae suits.36 By using and refining the Court's 
procedural rights standing test as a model, this Article proposes a 
workable standing test for states. 
Part I provides a brief overview of standing. Part II discusses the 
court of appeals' decision in Massachusetts. Part III examines 
Justice Stevens' majority opinion and Chief Justice Roberts' 
dissenting opinion in Massachusetts. Part IV explores the Court's 
parens patriae decisions and concludes that they support the 
Massachusetts decision in lowering standing barriers for states. Part 
V proposes a new test for states that relaxes the normal immediacy 
and redressability requirements. Part VI examines the policy 
implications for giving states and especially state attorneys general 
greater standing rights than ordinary citizens. 
I. A BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO STANDING 
A. Constitutional Standing 
Part I will provide only a brief overview of standing because 
the court of appeals' decision and the Supreme Court opinions in 
Massachusetts discuss standing requirements at great length. 
Standing doctrine defines "the characteristics a person or another 
juridical entity must possess to bring a suit."36 Standing require-
ments ensure that "a matter before the federal courts is a proper 
33. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438,1466 (2007) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) ("It 
is not at all clear how the Court's 'special solicitude' for Massachusetts plays out in the 
standing analysis, except as an implicit concession that petitioners cannot establish standing 
on traditional terms."). 
34. See infra Part I.C. 
35. See infra Part II. 
36. Michael E. Solimine, RecalibratingJusticiability in Ohio Courts, 51 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 
531,533 (2004). 
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case or controversy under Article III" and that the "Federal 
Judiciary respects 'the proper-and properly limited-role of the 
courts in a democratic society."'37 The federal courts have 
jurisdiction over a case only if at least one plaintiff can prove that 
it has standing for each form of relief sought. 38 A federal court must 
dismiss a case without deciding the merits if the plaintiff fails to 
meet the constitutional standing test. 39 
For standing in an Article III court, the Court presently requires 
a plaintiff to show: 
(1) [she] has suffered "an injury in fact" that is (a) concrete and 
particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or 
hypothetical; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged 
action of the defendant; and (3) it is likely, as opposed to merely 
speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable 
decision.40 
A plaintiff has the burden of establishing all three prongs of the 
standing test.41 
B. Generalized Injuries 
In cases involving generalized, abstract injuries that affect the 
public as a whole, especially cases involving alleged misuse of 
taxpayer funds,42 the Supreme Court has sometimes stated that 
37. DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 u.s. 332, 341 (2006) (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 
u.S. 737, 750 (1984». 
38. See id. at 351-53; Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 
U.S. 167, 185 (2000) ("[A] plaintiff must demonstrate standing for each form of relief sought."). 
39. See DaimlerChrysler, 547 U.S. at 340-41; Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at 180 ("[WJe 
have an obligation to assure ourselves that [petitioner] had Article III standing at the outset 
of the litigation."); Mank, supra note 9, at 23. 
40. Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at 180-81 (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 
U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992»; see also Mank, supra note 9, at 23-24. 
41. See DaimlerChrysler, 547 U.S. at 342 (stating that parties asserting federal 
jurisdiction must "carry the burden of establishing their standing under Article IIf'); Lujan, 
504 U.S. at 561; Mank, supra note 9, at 24. 
42. See Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2553 (2007) (holding that 
taxpayers do not have standing to challenge the White House program on federal aid to faith-
based organizations and limiting taxpayer challenges under the First Amendment's 
Establishment Clause to congressional legislation benefiting religion); DaimlerChrysler, 547 
U.S. at 342-46 (denying standing in a state taxpayer suit in part because plaintiffs' alleged 
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such injuries are more appropriately remedied by the political 
branches than the judiciary pursuant to the separation of powers 
doctrine.43 In Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study 
Group, Inc.,44 the Supreme Court stated that "we have declined to 
grant standing where the harm asserted amounts only to a 
generalized grievance shared by a large number of citizens in a 
substantially equal measure" because such suits raised "general 
prudential concerns 'about the proper-and properly limited-role 
of the courts in a democratic society."'45 In Gladstone Realtors v. 
Village of Bellwood,46 the Court explained that the generalized 
grievance doctrine enables "the judiciary ... to avoid deciding 
questions of broad social import where no individual rights would 
be vindicated and to limit access to the federal courts to those 
litigants best suited to assert a particular claim."47 Additionally, the 
generalized grievance doctrine assists courts in avoiding broader 
remedies than that "required by the precise facts to which the 
court's ruling would be applied.,,48 
There are serious problems with the Court's decisions discussing 
the issue of generalized grievances and standing.49 Before 1998, the 
injuries were common to the public at large and stating that federal taxpayers generally lack 
standing unless suit is based on the Constitution's Establishment Clause). But see FIast v. 
Cohen, 392 U.S. 83,105·06 (1968) (holding that a federal taxpayer had standing to challenge 
spending allegedly in violation of the Constitution's Establishment Clause because "the 
Establishment Clause ... specifically limit[s] the taxing and spending power conferred by Art. 
I, § 8"). 
43. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560·61, 575·77 (requiring "particularized" injury and stating that 
the Constitution assigns the political branches of government the responsibility for addressing 
grievances affecting the public at large); Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 
418 U.S. 208, 221 n.10 (1974) (stating that the judicial role of deciding cases involving 
particularized injuries "is in sharp contrast to the political processes in which the Congress 
can initiate inquiry and action, define issues and objectives, and exercise virtually unlimited 
power by way of hearings and reports, thus making a record for plenary consideration and 
solutions. The legislative function is inherently general rather than particular and is not 
intended to be responsive to adversaries asserting specific claims or interests peculiar to 
themselves."); Kimberly Breedon, Remedial Problems at the Intersection of the Political 
Question Doctrine, Standing and Equitable Discretion, 34 OHIO N.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 
2008); Mank, supra note 9, at 21·22. 
44. 438 U.S. 59 (1978). 
45. Id. at 80 (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975». 
46. 441 U.S. 91 (1979). 
47. Id. at 99·100. 
48. Schlesinger, 418 U.S. at 222. 
49. See generally Guilds, supra note 9, at 1876·85. 
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Court's generalized grievance decisions did not clearly explain 
whether the doctrine is a prudential limitation that Congress can 
override to allow such suits,50 or whether it is a mandatory 
constitutional doctrine. 51 The Lujan Court's requirement under 
Article III that a plaintiff demonstrate a particularized injury 
arguably requires that a plaintiff establish that its injury is 
different from the public at large, but the Court also suggested that 
victims of mass tort are entitled to sue.52 Before 1998, the Court did 
50. In addition to the three-part test for constitutional Article III standing suits, courts 
can impose policy-based prudential limits on standing, for example, by requiring a suit to be 
within the "zone of interests" of the relevant statute, prohibiting third-party suits, or 
restricting suits asserting generalized grievances. See, e.g., Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 
162-63 (1997) (describing the "zone of interests" standard as a "prudential limitation" rather 
than a mandatory constitutional requirement); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 
561-62 (1992) (stating that a court may reject standing if plaintiff is asserting the rights of a 
third-party not before the court); Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 
U.S. 59, 80 (1978) (stating that a court may deny standing if a suit would raise "general 
prudential concerns 'about the proper-and properly limited-role of the courts in a 
democratic society.' Thus, we have declined to grant standing where the harm asserted 
amounts only to a generalized grievance shared by a large number of citizens in a 
substantially equal measure." (quoting Warth, 422 U.S. at 498) (citations omitted»; Flast v. 
Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 97 (1968) (stating that prudential requirements are based "in policy, 
rather than purely constitutional, considerations"); Guilds, supra note 9, at 1875-76, 1878-80 
(noting that it is not always clear whether the Court's reservations about generalized 
grievances are a prudential limitation or a constitutional objection); Mank, supra note 9, at 
28 (discussing prudential limitations as including restrictions on generalized grievances); 
Zachary D. Sakas, Footnotes, Forests, and Fallacy: An Examination of the Circuit Split 
Regarding Standing in Procedural Injury-based Programmatic Challenges, 13 U. BALT. J. 
ENVTL. L. 175, 179 (2006) (stating that prudential limitations are policy-based). Unlike 
constitutional limits on standing, however, Congress may expressly override prudential 
limitations by, for example, providing expansive citizen suit provisions that reach the limits 
of Article III standing. See, e.g., Bennett, 520 U.S. at 162, 166 (holding that "unlike their 
constitutional counterparts, [prudential limits on standing] can be modified or abrogated by 
Congress," and concluding that a citizen suit provision abrogated the zone of interest 
limitation); Warth, 422 U.S. at 501; see also Mank, supra note 9, at 28; Sakas, supra, at 179. 
The Clean Air Act contains an express citizen suit provision that allows both citizens and 
states to sue. 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1) (2000). 
51. See Guilds, supra note 9, at 1878-84 (discussing confusion over whether the Court's 
standing cases prohibiting generalized grievances are constitutional or prudential 
limitations); Cass R. Sunstein, Informational Regulation and Informational Standing: Akins 
and Beyond, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 613, 643-44 (1999) (arguing that earlier cases implied that 
prohibition against generalized grievances was prudential in nature, but that Lujan suggested 
that prohibition might be constitutional in nature). 
52. Lujan, 504 U.S_ at 560-61,572-77 (requiring "particularized" injury and stating that 
the Constitution assigns the political branches of government the responsibility for addressing 
grievances affecting the public at large, but also implying that plaintiffs who have concrete 
injuries from a mass tort or mass fraud have standing to sue); Guilds, supra note 9, at 1881-84 
HeinOnline -- 49 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1713 2007-2008
2008] NEW STANDING TEST FOR STATES 1713 
not provide a clear definition of which types of injuries are 
particularized enough for judicial redress, and which injuries are too 
general for judicial relief. 53 For example, the Court suggested that 
victims of mass torts are eligible for standing because each has his 
own unique personal injuries even if large numbers of people share 
similar injuries, but certain language in some of its decisions also 
suggested that if all members of the public received the same type 
of injury then there is no judicial redress. 54 
In its 1998 decision, Federal Election Commission v. Akins 
(Akins), the Court clarified which types of mass or general injuries 
are appropriate for judicial redress.55 The Court granted standing 
to voters who requested information from the Federal Election 
Commission, even though the plaintiffs were similarly situated to 
other voters, because the statute at issue overcame any prudential 
limitations against generalized grievances. 56 The Court explained 
that it would deny standing for widely shared, generalized injuries 
only if the harm is both widely shared and "of an abstract and 
indefinite nature-for example, harm to the 'common concern for 
obedience to law.",57 The Akins Court stated that its prior decisions 
(discussing whether the Lujan decision established a constitutional prohibition against 
generalized grievances). 
53. Guilds, supra note 9, at 1884-92 ("Beyond the uncertainty about whether generalized 
grievances are constitutional or prudential limitations, there is also uncertainty about their 
precise definition."). 
54. See id. at 1884-92. Compare Lujan, 504 U.S. at 572 (implying that plaintiffs who have 
concrete injuries from a mass tort or mass fraud have standing to sue), Warth, 422 U.S. at 501 
(holding that a plaintiff may be able to satisfy Article III standing requirements, "even if it 
is an injury shared by a large class of other possible litigants"), and United States v. Students 
Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669, 688 (1973) ("[T]o deny 
standing to persons who are in fact injured simply because many others are also injured, 
would mean that the most injurious and widespread ... actions could be questioned by 
nobody."), with Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61, 572-77 (requiring "particularized" injury and 
stating that the Constitution assigns the political branches of government the responsibility 
for addressing grievances affecting the public at large), and Duke Power, 438 U.S. at 80 ("[W]e 
have declined to grant standing where the harm asserted amounts only to a generalized 
grievance shared by a large number of citizens in a substantially equal measure."). 
55. 524 U.S. 11,21-25 (1998); see David R Hodas, Standing and Climate Change: Can 
Anyone Complain About the Weather?, 15 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 451, 471 (2000) (discussing 
Akins); Mank, supra note 9, at 37-40; Sunstein, supra note 51, at 634-36, 644-45. 
56. Akins, 524 U.S. at 19-21; see Hodas, supra note 55, at 471; Mank, supra note 9, at 37; 
Sunstein, supra note 51, at 634-36, 642-45, 671-75 (discussing Akins and concluding that the 
statute at issue overrode any prudential limitations against generalized grievances). 
57. Akins, 524 U.S. at 23-25 (quoting L. Singer & Sons v. Union Pac. RR Co., 311 U.S. 
295,303 (1940»; see Hodas, supra note 55, at 471-72; Mank, supra note 9, at 37-40 (discussing 
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denied standing only if an alleged injury was too abstract, but 
approved standing even in cases in which many people suffered the 
same injury if the harm was concrete. 58 Justice Breyer's majority 
opinion, which was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices 
Stevens, Kennedy, Souter, and Ginsburg, observed that the fact that 
"an injury is widely shared ... does not, by itself, automatically 
disqualify an interest for Article III purposes. Such an interest, 
where sufficiently concrete, may count as an 'injury in fact."'59 The 
Akins decision stated that a plaintiff who suffers a concrete actual 
injury can normally fulfill the injury in fact requirement even 
though many others have suffered similar injuries: 
[T]he fact that a political forum may be more readily available 
where an injury is widely shared ... does not, by itself, 
automatically disqualify an interest for Article III purposes .... 
This conclusion seems particularly obvious where (to use a 
hypothetical example) large numbers of individuals suffer the 
same common-law injury (say, a widespread mass tort), or where 
large numbers of voters suffer interference with voting rights 
conferred by law. We conclude that, similarly, the informational 
injury at issue here, directly related to voting, the most basic of 
political rights, is sufficiently concrete and specific such that the 
fact that it is widely shared does not deprive Congress of 
constitutional power to authorize its vindication in the federal 
courts. 60 
In Pye v. United States,61 the Fourth Circuit summarized Akins as 
holding that "[s]o long as the plaintiff ... has a concrete and 
particularized injury, it does not matter that legions of other 
persons have the same injury."62 
The Akins decision did not settle all questions about when 
plaintiffs alleging generalized grievances are entitled to standing. 
Akins suggested that the Court's reservations about standing for 
Akins); Sunstein, supra note 51, at 634·36. 
58. Akins, 524 U.S. at 24·25; see Mank, supra note 9, at 38; Sunstein, supra note 51, at 
636,644. 
59. Akins, 524 U.S. at 24 (empasis added); see Mank, supra note 9, at 38. 
60. Akins, 524 U.S. at 24·25 (citations omitted); see Hodas, supra note 55, at 472; Mank, 
supra note 9, at 38. 
61. 269 F.3d 459 (4th Cir. 2001). 
62. [d. at 469. 
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generalized grievances are usually prudential limitations that 
Congress may override in a statute, but the decision did not 
completely eliminate the possibility that Article III, in some cir-
cumstances, places constitutional limits on generalized grievances. 63 
In his dissenting opinion in Akins, Justice Scalia, who was joined 
by Justices O'Connor and Thomas, argued that "undifferentiated" 
grievances, "'common to all members of the public' ... must be 
pursued by political, rather than judicial, means.,,64 He contended 
that all generalized grievances that affect the public at large should 
be addressed by the political branches even if the injuries are 
concrete.65 Under his approach, an injury must be particularized if 
it is to be heard in the federal courts.66 In a law review article he 
wrote several years before Akins, then-Judge Scalia argued that 
separation of powers principles require courts to limit standing to 
prevent judicial overreaching into the domain of the political 
branches. His Akins dissent follows that approach in contending 
that federal courts should never address general grievances because 
they are more appropriately the subject of the political branches.67 
The majority opinion in Massachusetts cited Akins with ap-
prova1.68 Like Akins, the Massachusetts decision emphasized that 
the statute at issue "authorized this type of challenge to EPA action" 
to overcome any prudential questions about whether the issue was 
too general and better suited for political resolution.69 By contrast, 
Chief Justice Roberts did not cite Akins and instead cited cases in 
which the Court had warned of the dangers of the federal courts 
63. See Sunstein, supra note 51, at 637, 643-45, 671-75. 
64. Akins, 524 U.S. at 35 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Richardson, 418 
U.S. 166, 177 (1974»; see Rodas, supra note 55, at 472-73; Mank, supra note 9, at 39; 
Sunstein, supra note 51, at 637,646-48. 
65. Akins, 524 U.S. at 35 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see Rodas, supra note 55, at 473; Mank, 
supra note 9, at 39; Sunstein, supra note 51, at 637, 646-48. 
66. See Akins, 524 U.S. at 35 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Mank, supra note 9, at 39; Sunstein, 
supra note 51, at 637. 
67. See Akins, 524 U.S. at 35-37 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of 
Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881, 
881, 896 (1983); see also Mank, supra note 9, at 29, 38-39 (discussing then-Judge Scalia's law 
review article on standing and his subsequent standing opinions ai? a member of Supreme 
Court); Sunstein, supra note 51, at 643-44. 
68. Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1456 (2007). 
69. Id. at 1453 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1) (2000». 
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addressing generalized policy issues that are better left to the 
political branches of government.70 
C. Relaxed Standing in Procedural Rights Cases 
The Court has relaxed the immediacy and redressability standing 
requirements for procedural rights plaintiffs who could plausibly 
suffer a concrete injury in the future. 71 In footnote seven of the 
Lujan decision, Justice Scalia explained that litigants who may 
suffer a concrete injury from a procedural error by the government 
are entitled to a more relaxed application of the redressability 
and immediacy standing requirements because there is often a 
significant time lag between when a procedural error may occur and 
when that error might affect the plaintiff. He stated: 
There is this much truth to the assertion that "procedural 
rights" are special: The person who has been accorded a 
procedural right to protect his concrete interests can assert that 
right without meeting all the normal standards for 
redressability and immediacy. Thus, under our case law, one 
living adjacent to the site for proposed construction of a federally 
licensed dam has standing to challenge the licensing agency's 
failure to prepare an environmental impact statement, even 
though he cannot establish with any certainty that the 
statement will cause the license to be withheld or altered, and 
even though the dam will not be completed for many years. 72 
Justice Scalia limited footnote seven standing to plaintiffs who 
will suffer concrete injuries if the government builds the dam. 
According to footnote seven, a plaintiff living next to a dam has a 
potential concrete injury that is real enough to justify standing, but 
"persons who live (and propose to live) at the other end of the 
country from the dam" do not have "concrete interests affected" and, 
therefore, do not have standing to challenge a procedural violation.73 
70. See id. at 1464-71 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); see also infra Part III.B. 
71. See Mank, supra note 9, at 35. 
72. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 572 n.7 (1992); see Cantrell v. City of 
Long Beach, 241 F.3d 674, 682 (9th Cir. 2001) (discussing relaxed standing requirements for 
procedural injuries); Bertagna, supra note 10, at 457; Mank, supra note 9, at 35-36 n.240. 
73. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 572 n.7; see also id. at 573 n.8 (''We do not hold that an individual 
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In footnote seven of the Lujan decision, Justice Scalia used the 
example of a plaintifi' requesting, under the National Environmental 
Policy Act (NEPA),74 an environmental impact statement (EIS) 
studying the potential effects of a proposed dam located near the 
plaintiffs home as the classic example of a procedural injury.75 
NEPA is a purely procedural statute that requires the government 
to examine the environmental consequences of its actions and to 
give the public an opportunity to comment on proposed government 
projects, but gives the agency the sole authority to decide whether 
to build the project.76 If a plaintiff demonstrates that the 
government has failed to adequately examine the environmental 
consequences of a proposed project, a judge can order the 
government to conduct an environmental assessment or a more 
detailed EIS to study the environmental impacts of a proposed 
government action, but cannot order the government to take any 
substantive action, because the agency has the sole policy-making 
discretion to decide whether the value of the proposed action 
outweighs any environmental consequences.77 Thus, even if a 
plaintiff is successful in forcing the government to write an EIS 
addressing the environmental impacts of a proposed dam, the 
government may still decide to build the dam. Without the relaxed 
standards for redressability and immediacy in footnote seven, most 
NEPA plaintiffs could not establish standing.78 
cannot enforce procedural rights; he assuredly can, so long as the procedures in question are 
designed to protect some threatened concrete interest of his that is the ultimate basis of his 
standing."); William W. Buzbee, Standing and the Statutory Universe, 11 DUKE ENVTL. L. & 
POL'y F. 247, 257 (2001). 
74. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370f (2000). 
75. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 572 n.7; see Mank, supra note 9, at 35-36. 
76. See National Environmental Policy Act §§ 4321-4370f; see also Sakas, supra note 50, 
at 187; Miriam Wolok, Standing for Environmental Groups: Procedural Injury as Injury-in-
Fact, 32 NAT. RESOURCES J. 163, 182 (1992) ("Generally, the procedural injuries that plaintiffs 
allege under NEPA are an increased risk that an agency overlooked environmental 
consequences in its decision-making process and the lost opportunity to participate in that 
process." (footnotes omitted». 
77. See Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350 (1989) ("NEPA 
itself does not mandate particular results, but simply prescribes the necessary process."); 
Mank, supra note 9, at 47; Matthew William Nelson, Comment, NEPA and Standing: Halting 
the Spread o{"Slash-and-Burn" Jurisprudence, 31 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 253, 257, 279-80 (1997) 
("Therefore, while environmental groups can challenge the procedural adequacy of an EIS, 
they cannot use the courts to impose or require any particular results."). 
78. See Mank, supra note 9, at 36. 
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The Lujan case provides little guidance on how to apply footnote 
seven, in part because the Court did not actually employ it in that 
case. 79 In Lujan, the plaintiffs challenged the government's failure 
to follow a mandated consultative procedure in the Endangered 
Species Act that requires federal agencies to first consult with the 
Secretary of Interior to prevent or mitigate any harm before the 
agency finances, authorizes, or pursues an action that may harm a 
threatened or endangered species or its habitat.80 The plaintiffs 
failed to establish the immediacy and concreteness portions of the 
standing test because neither affiant had immediate plans to return 
to visit endangered species in Egypt and Sri Lanka that were 
allegedly threatened by foreign construction projects funded in part 
by United States agencies; therefore, they could not allege any 
concrete harm from the agencies' failure to consult the Secretary 
about the endangered species.81 Because the plaintiffs lived so far 
from the alleged harms and failed to demonstrate an injury in 
fact, the Lujan Court did not need to address any hard questions 
or implications involving footnote seven. Furthermore, in Lujan, 
Justice Scalia's discussion of redressability garnered support from 
only a plurality of the Court-Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice 
White, and Justice Thomas-because Justices Kennedy and Souter 
declined to join that portion of the opinion, and thus the decision 
does not provide clear guidance on this issue.82 Although footnote 
79. Douglas Sinor, Tenth Circuit Surveys: Environmental Law, 75 DENY. U. L. REV. 859, 
879 (1998) ("Footnote seven, however, is confusing and raises more questions than it answers, 
since the court did not apply the standards it set forth ... because Lujan was not a procedural 
rights case. Thus, the lower courts are given the task of interpreting and applying the 
standards it set forth." (footnote omitted». 
80. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 558·59 (discussing Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 
1536(a)(2) (1988»; Bertagna, supra note 10, at 456. 
81. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 562·64; see also id. at 579·80 (Kennedy, J., concurring); Brian 
J. Gatchel, Information and Procedural Standing After Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 11 J. 
LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 75, 92·94 (1995) (arguing that the plaintiffs in Lujan failed to meet the 
immediacy requirement of standing); Mank, supra note 9, at 30·31 (stating that the Lujan 
decision found that plaintiffs failed to establish a concrete or imminent injury). 
82. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 568·71 (part II·B of the opinion); id. at 580 (Kennedy, J., 
concurring); Buzbee, supra note 73, at 258; Mank, supra note 9, at 32·33; Sunstein, supra note 
9, at 206. 
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seven is arguably dicta in the Lujan case,83 the Massachusetts Court 
treated footnote seven as binding precedent.84 
A serious weakness of footnote seven is that it does not clearly 
explain the degree to which redressability and immediacy re-
quirements for standing are waived or relaxed in procedural rights 
cases, the plaintiffs burden of proof to establish standing in a 
procedural rights case, or how to define a procedural right.85 In the 
dam hypothetical, for example, the immediacy requirement argu-
ably should be eliminated for plaintiffs because they have no control 
over how quickly the government will build the dam; but the Court 
never expressly addresses that issue.86 
The redressability portion of the Lujan opinion only gathered a 
plurality and thus is not binding precedent.87 Additionally, the 
Court's plurality opinion on that point implicitly appears to address 
normal redressability requirements rather than the relaxed 
requirements of footnote seven.88 Footnote seven does not provide 
any clear guidelines concerning the extent to which courts are to 
relax or eliminate redress ability requirements for procedural rights 
83. Even though footnote seven was technically dicta in the Lujan case, many 
commentators believe that it likely represents the thinking of a majority of the Court because 
the dissenters in the case probably agreed with it. See William W. Buzbee, Expanding the 
Zone, Tilting the Field: Zone of Interests and Article III Standing Analysis after Bennett v. 
Spear, 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 763, 808·10 (1997); Mank, supra note 9, at 36 n.241; Sakas, supra 
note 50, at 185. 
84. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1453 (2007) (majority opinion); see also 
infra notes 131·33 and accompanying text. 
85. See Gatchel, supra note 81, at 99·100 (criticizing footnote seven in Lujan for failing 
to explain to what extent the immediacy and redressability standing requirements are relaxed 
or eliminated for procedural rights plaintiffs); Mank, supra note 9, at 36 n.244 (criticizing 
footnote seven and citing commentators); Sinor, supra note 79, at 879·81; Sunstein, supra note 
9, at 208, 225·26; Christopher T. Burt, Comment, Procedural Injury Standing After Lujan v. 
Defenders of Wildlife, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 275, 285 (1995) ("Lujan's procedural injury dicta is 
not without its problems, however. At best, it is vague and provides little guidance for 
prospective plaintiffs and the lower courts .... "). 
86. See Gatchel, supra note 81, at 93·94, 99·100; Sinor, supra note 79, at 880. 
87. See Sunstein, supra note 9, at 206; see also supra note 82 and accompanying text. 
88. See Gatchel, supra note 81, at 95·96, 108 ("Implicitly, Justice Scalia's opinion suggests 
that he was applying the regular standard of redressability rather than the relaxed standard 
of redressability that a 'person who has been accorded a procedural right to protect his 
concrete interests' is entitled. Presumably, the Defenders plaintiffs did not receive the relaxed 
redressability requirements because they failed to demonstrate the prerequisite injury in fact 
sufficiently concrete to violate a procedural right which redressability was designed to 
protect."). 
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plaintiffs.89 The simplest solution would be to eliminate re-
dressability requirements for procedural rights plaintiffs who meet 
footnote seven requirements rather than to establish a complicated 
intermediate redressability test for such plaintiffs;90 but it is not 
clear whether Lujan intended to eliminate that requirement. 
The courts of appeals are divided regarding how to apply footnote 
seven to NEP A cases; they disagree about the burden of proof a 
plaintiff must meet to demonstrate that she is likely to be harmed 
by the agency's action.91 As is discussed in Part III, there is also 
uncertainty about which cases are procedural rights cases that are 
governed by footnote seven, and which are substantive cases in 
which the relaxed approach is inapplicable.92 Lujan did not provide 
a comprehensive definition of a "procedural rights case." Lower 
courts have sought to define a "procedural injury,"93 but the 
Supreme Court has not provided a definitive answer. 
89. See id. at 100·06, 108; Sinor, supra note 79, at 880. 
90. See Gatchel, supra note 81, at 105-06, 108. 
91. Compare Fla. Audubon Soc'y v. Bentsen, 94 F.3d 658, 666-72 (D.C. Cir. 1996) 
(applying a strict four-part test for standing in procedural rights cases, including requiring 
a procedural rights plaintiff to demonstrate a particularized injury-that there is a 
"particularized environmental interest of the plaintiff, and that it is a substantial probability 
that the government act ... will cause that demonstrably increased risk of injury" alleged by 
the plaintiff), with Citizens for Better Forestry v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 341 F.3d 961, 972-75 
(9th Cir. 2003) (rejecting Florida Audubon's standing test for procedural rights plaintiffs and 
quoting Lujan to explain that such plaintiffs "need only establish 'the reasonable probability 
of the challenged action's threat to [their] concrete interest"'), and Comm. to Save the Rio 
Hondo v. Lucero, 102 F.3d 445, 447-52 (10th Cir. 1996) (disagreeing with Florida Audubon's 
"substantial probability" test for procedural rights plaintiffs and instead adopting a test that 
plaintiff must establish an "increased risk of adverse environmental consequences" from the 
alleged failure to follow NEPA). See Bertagna, supra note 10, at 461-64 (discussing the split 
between the Ninth and District of Columbia Circuits on the causation portion of the standing 
test); Mank, supra note 9, at 45 (discussing the split among circuits about how to apply the 
footnote seven standing test in NEPA cases); Sakas, supra note 50, at 192 (noting that in 
procedural injury challenges to programmatic rules,"[t]he Ninth and Seventh Circuits have 
held that a plaintiff need not have a claim that is site-specific, while the D.C., Eighth, and 
Eleventh Circuits have created a stricter standing doctrine where a site-specific injury is 
necessary"). 
92. See infra notes 129-33 and accompanying text. 
93. See Hodges v. Abraham, 300 F.3d 432, 444 (4th Cir. 2002) (defining a procedural right 
as "the right to have the Executive observe procedures mandated by law"); Friends of the 
Earth v. U.S. Navy, 841 F.2d 927, 931 (9th Cir. 1988) (defining procedural injury as applying 
to situations where the plaintiff alleges that a statute requires certain procedures be followed 
"to ensure that the environmental consequences of a project are adequately evaluated" and 
where the responsible agency fails to comply with those procedures); Bertagna, supra note 10, 
at 456 n.216. 
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II. THE COURT OF APPEALS' DIVIDED OPINION IN MASSACHUSETTS 
In 1999, a group of nineteen private organizations petitioned the 
EPA "to regulate 'greenhouse gas emissions from new motor 
vehicles under § 202 of the Clean Air Act.",94 Mter providing for 
public comment, on September 8, 2003, the EPA entered an order 
denying the rule-making petition.95 The EPA provided two grounds 
for its denial of the petition: "(1) that contrary to the opinions of its 
former general counsels" issued in 1998 and 1999, "the Clean Air 
Act does not authorize EPA to issue mandatory regulations to 
address global climate change, and (2) that even if the agency had 
the authority to set greenhouse gas emission standards, it would 
be unwise to do so at this time.,,96 A month later, in October 2003, 
the petitioners were joined by twelve intervenor states, with 
Massachusetts as lead petitioner, in filing suit in the federal D.C. 
Circuit Court of Appeals to seek review of the denia1.97 
The court of appeals, in a divided opinion, denied the petition for 
review. Although each of the three judges on the court of appeals 
panel wrote a separate opinion, two judges agreed "that the EPA 
Administrator properly exercised his discretion under § 202(a)(1) in 
denying the petition for rule making."98 This Article will focus on the 
standing portion of the decision. 
To prove that they met standing requirements, the petitioners 
filed several affidavits from scientists and property owners that 
generally alleged that rising levels of GHGs were causing global 
warming that was likely to result in significant damage to state 
and private property.99 To specifically address the causation and 
redressability prongs of the standing test, the petitioners relied 
on two affidavits from a climatologist and an engineer alleging 
that reducing vehicle emissions would reduce the harms to the 
94. Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1449 (2007) (majority opinion); see 42 U.S.C. 
§ 7521(a)(I) (2000) (quoting the original petition). 
95. See Control of Emissions from New Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed. Reg. 
52,922 (notice of denial Sept. 8, 2003). 
96. Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1450 (summarizing 68 Fed. Reg. 52,922, 52,925-31) 
(citations omitted). 
97. See id. at 1451; Mank, supra note 9, at 8-9 nn.41-44 (citing petitions). 
98. Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d 50, 58 (D.C. Cir. 2005), rev'd, 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007). 
99. See id. at 54. 
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petitioners from GHGs. lOO Conversely, the EPA argued that the 
petitioners had "not 'adequately demonstrated' two elements of 
standing: that their alleged injuries were 'caused by EPA's decision 
not to regulate emissions of greenhouse gases from mobile sources'; 
and that their injuries 'can be redressed by a decision in their favor' 
by this court."lOl 
A. Judge Randolph 
In his opinion announcing the court's judgment, Judge Randolph 
avoided deciding whether the petitioners had standing even though 
courts must usually determine whether a plaintiff has standing 
before considering the merits of its claims.102 Judge Randolph 
reasoned that the court could first decide the merits of the case 
because the merits of the case and the issue of standing 
overlapped. lo3 Although the petitioners' affidavits and declarations 
sufficiently supported each element of standing to withstand a 
motion for summary judgment, he concluded that the petitioner 
faced a higher burden to meet standing requirements because 
some of the EPA's evidence controverted the petitioners' claims 
that GHGs from new vehicles would significantly increase global 
warming. 104 Because of conflicting evidence about causation and 
redressability, Judge Randolph proceeded to decide the case on the 
merits. I05 
On the merits, Judge Randolph did not directly decide whether 
the EPA Administrator has the authority under Section 202 of the 
CAA to regulate GHGs that "'in his judgment' 'may reasonably be 
anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.",106 Instead, he 
concluded that, even assuming that the EPA Administrator has the 
authority to regulate GHGs pursuant to Section 202, the EPA has 
the discretion not to regulate GHG emissions from motor vehicles 
100. See id. at 54·55; id. at 65-66 (Tatel, J., dissenting); Mank, supra note 9, at 26-28 
(summarizing the causation and redressability prongs). 
101. Massachusetts, 415 F.3d at 54 (quoting Brieffor Respondent at 16). 
102. Id.; see Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1451 (majority opinion). 
103. Massachusetts, 415 F.3d at 56; see Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1451. 
104. See Massachusetts, 415 F.3d at 55-57. 
105. See id. 
106. Id. at 57-58 (discussing EPA's authority to regulate GHGs under 42 U.S.C. § 
7521(a)(1) (2000) and quoting the regulation). 
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because the EPA's denial of the rulemaking petition did not have 
to be based solely on the scientific evidence, which includes the 
EPA's concern about scientific uncertainties about global warming. 
Rather, the denial could also be based on "policy" considerations 
such as the agency's "concern that unilateral regulation of U.S. 
motor vehicle emissions could weaken efforts to persuade developing 
countries to reduce the intensity of greenhouse gases" and the Bush 
Administration's preference for "voluntary emission reduction 
programs and initiatives with private entities to develop new 
technology .... "107 Judge Randolph determined that the court should 
give deference to the EPA's discretionary policy judgment in this 
case because the agency was addressing complex and uncertain 
issues at the frontiers of scientific knowledge. lOS Accordingly, he 
held as the judgment of the divided court of appeals that "the EPA 
Administrator properly exercised his discretion under § 202(a)(1) in 
denying the petition for rulemaking."109 
B. Judge Sentelle 
Judge Sentelle dissented in part and concurred in the judgment 
because he argued that courts are required to decide standing 
questions before reaching the merits and thus he disagreed with 
Judge Randolph's approach of deciding the merits without resolving 
the issue of standing. 110 Judge Sentelle concluded that the EPA was 
correct to dismiss the petition because the petitioners had "not 
demonstrated the element of injury necessary to establish standing 
under Article 1I1.,,1ll He argued that the Article III standing test in 
Lujan requires a plaintiff to demonstrate that he has suffered a 
"particularized" injury and not just a generalized injury common to 
the public at large. 112 Judge Sentelle argued that, pursuant to the 
Constitution's separation of powers, generalized public injuries 
should be addressed by the politically elected Executive Branch and 
Congress rather than the courts: 
107. [d. at 58. 
108. See id. 
109. [d. 
110. See id. at 59 (Sentelle, J., dissenting in part and concurring in judgment). 
111. [d. 
112. [d. 
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A case such as this, in which plaintiffs lack particularized injury 
is particularly recommended to the Executive Branch and the 
Congress. Because plaintiffs' claimed injury is common to all 
members of the public, the decision whether or not to regulate 
is a policy call requiring a weighing of costs against the 
likelihood of success, best made by the democratic branches 
taking into account the interests of the public at large. There are 
two other branches of government. It is to those other branches 
that the petitioners should repair. 113 
Because global warming is ''harmful to humanity at large," Judge 
Sentelle concluded that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that 
they were sufficiently injured by global warming to have standing 
in the federal courts because "the alleged harm is not particularized, 
not specific, and in my view, not justiciable."1l4 Although he 
dissented on standing and jurisdiction, Judge Sentelle accepted the 
contrary view as the law of the case and joined Judge Randolph's 
judgment on the merits dismissing the petition as the result closest 
to that which he preferred.1l5 
C. Judge Tatel 
In his dissenting opmIOn, Judge Tatel concluded that 
Massachusetts had at least "satisfied each element of Article III 
standing-injury, causation, and redressability."ll6 He argued that 
Massachusetts made particularized allegations demonstrating a 
"substantial probability"117 that projected rises in sea level would 
lead to serious losses to its coastal property and that these specific 
allegations of injury were a "far cry" from the type of generalized 
harm that Judge Sentelle contended was insufficient to establish 
Article III jurisdiction.lls As to causation, Judge Tatel determined 
that the petitioners' affidavits provided strong evidence that GHGs, 
including U.S. vehicle emissions, contributed to the sea level 
113. [d. at 60; see also Breedon, supra note 43. 
114. Massachusetts, 415 F.3d at 60. 
115. See id. at 60-61. 
116. [d. at 64 (Tatel, J., dissenting). 
117. [d. (quoting Sierra Club v. EPA, 292 F.3d 895, 898 (D.C. Cir. 2002». 
118. [d. at 65. 
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changes that threatened Massachusetts' coastal property.1l9 As to 
redressability, he concluded that there was evidence from one ofthe 
petitioners' experts, a former EPA climatologist, that a favorable 
judicial decision requiring the EPA to regulate GHGs and vehicle 
emissions would delay and reduce the harm to Massachusetts' 
coastline.120 In response to the EPA's argument that the United 
States' regulation of vehicle emissions would be ineffective unless 
other nations joined the effort, Judge Tatel observed that the 
petitioner submitted an affidavit from the one-time director of the 
EPA's motor-vehicle pollution control efforts, which concluded that 
the EPA's requirement of enforceable emission standards would 
lead to the development of new emission control technologies by 
other nations. 121 On the merits, Judge Tatel concluded that the 
Clean Air Act granted the EPA the authority to regulate GHGs, and 
that the agency's policy concerns about the impact of mandatory 
regulation on the president's ability to negotiate GHG agreements 
with other nations did not justify its refusal to make an endan-
germent finding about the harms of GHGs required by the 
statute.122 
III. THE SUPREME COURT'S NEW STANDING TEST FOR STATES 
A. Justice Stevens' Majority Opinion on Standing 
1. Congress May Broadly Define What Constitutes an Injury 
In addressing whether the petitioners had standing, the 
Massachusetts majority opinion began by emphasizing that 
Congress specifically authorized citizen suits in the CAA, and relied 
heavily upon Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion in Lujan. 123 
Citing Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion in Lujan, Justice 
Stevens observed "[t]hat [congressional] authorization is of critical 
119. See id. 
120. See id. at 65-66. 
121. See id. 
122. See id. at 73, 80-81. 
123. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1453 (2007) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1) 
(2000». 
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importance to the standing inquiry.,,124 Justice Stevens, in 
Massachusetts, quoted Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion in 
Lujan for the principle that "Congress has the power to define 
injuries and articulate chains of causation that will give rise to a 
case or controversy where none existed before" provided that 
Congress "identif[ies] the injury it seeks to vindicate and relaters] 
the injury to the class of persons entitled to bring suit."125 To qualify 
the broad view of congressional authority to confer standing, Justice 
Stevens, again quoting Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion, stated 
that the Court would not "entertain citizen suits to vindicate the 
public's nonconcrete interest in the proper administration of the 
laws.,,126 Because Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion in Lujan, 
which was joined by Justice Souter, provided the crucial votes for a 
majority in that case, a number of commentators have argued that 
his concurrence-rather than Justice Scalia's nominal majority 
opinion, which was fully joined by only Chief Justice Rehnquist, 
Justice White, and Justice Thomas-practically constituted the 
defining law in that case.127 Furthermore, in the five-to-four 
Massachusetts decision, Justice Stevens likely had to secure Justice 
Kennedy's vote by assuring him that the majority opinion was 
consistent with Justice Kennedy's prior opinions on standing.128 
124. [d. (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 580 (1992) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in judgment». 
125. [d. 
126. [d. 
127. See, e.g., Buzbee, supra note 73, at 279; Mank, supra note 9, at 63-64 (arguing that the 
Akins decision followed Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion in Lujan). 
128. See, e.g., Wooing Kennedy on Warming, Posting of Tony Mauro to BLT: The Blog of 
Legal Times, http://legaltimes.typepad.comlbltJ2007/04/wooing..kennedy_.html (Apr. 4, 2007, 
10:11 EST) (arguing that Justice Kennedy's vote was crucial in the Massachusetts decision 
and that Justice Stevens and Chief Justice Roberts each tried to win Justice Kennedy's vote 
on the standing issue); Posting of Aaron M. Streett to PrawfsBlawg, http://prawfsblawg.blogs. 
comlprawfsblawg/2007/weekI4/index.html (Apr. 4, 2007, 16:43 EST) ("Although this opinion 
has been touted for its discussion of standing principles, less attention has been paid to the 
important legal principle for which it stands: that it is always prudent to curry favor with 
[Justice Kennedy] to hold his critical fifth vote."). Many commentators believe that Justice 
Kennedy is the key swing vote on the Supreme Court since Sandra Day O'Connor's retirement 
in 2006. See, e.g., Michael C. Blumm & Sherry Bosse, Justice Kennedy and the Environment: 
Property, States' Rights, and a Persistent Search for Nexus, 82 WASH. L. REV. 667 (2007); Tony 
Mauro, Eyes on Kennedy as Supreme Court Debates Global Warming Case, LEGAL TIMES, Nov. 
30,2006, http://www.law.Comljsp/article.jsp?id=1164810399422; Analysis: Kennedy Key to 
Global Warming Challenge, Posting of Lyle Denniston to SCOTUSblog, http://www. 
scotusblog.com/wp/commentary-and-analysis/analysis-kennedy-key-to-global-warming-
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The majority opinion acknowledged that a plaintiff must dem-
onstrate that the "[challenged] action injures him in a concrete and 
personal way,,,129 but applied a more relaxed analysis of what 
constitutes a concrete injury because the petitioners were asserting 
a procedural right. 130 The Court applied the relaxed standards for 
redressability and immediacy applicable to procedural rights cases 
following footnote seven in Lujan because the Massachusetts case 
involved "the right to challenge agency action unlawfully withheld, 
§ 7607(b)(1)."131 Following Lujan, Justice Stevens observed that, 
where Congress grants a procedural right to a plaintiff, as in a 
citizen suit provision, "that litigant has standing if there is some 
possibility that the requested relief will prompt the injury-causing 
party to reconsider the decision that allegedly harmed the 
litigant."132 Professor Adler has argued that Massachusetts is not a 
procedural rights case and that therefore the Court erred in 
applying footnote seven standing in this case.133 
2. The Special Standing Rights of States 
In addition to applying the lenient standing analysis for 
procedural rights plaintiffs under footnote seven, the Court also 
applied a more generous standing analysis because Massachusetts 
is a state.134 Because "[o]nly one of the petitioners needs to have 
standing to permit us to consider the petition for review," Justice 
Stevens, like Judge Tatel, focused on "the special position and 
interest of Massachusetts."135 Justice Stevens stated that "[i]t is of 
considerable relevance that the party seeking review here is a 
sovereign State and not, as it was in Lujan, a private individual."136 
Relying on Justice Holmes' 1907 opinion in Tennessee Copper, which 
challenge! (Nov. 29, 2006, 11:34 EST). 
129. Massachusettsv. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1453 (2007) (majority opinion) (quoting Lujan, 
504 U.S. at 581 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment». 
130. See id. 
131. [d. (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 572 n.7 (majority opinion»; see Mank, supra note 9, at 
35·36 (discussing relaxed standing requirements for procedural injuries). 
132. Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1453 (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 572 n.7). 
133. See infra Part III.C.2. 
134. See Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1454; Stevenson, supra note 3, at 2 n.3. 
135. Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1453-54. 
136. [d. at 1454. 
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authorized Georgia to protect its citizens from air pollution from 
outside its borders because of the state's quasi-sovereign interest 
in its natural resources and the health of its citizens, the majority 
opinion emphasized that the Court long ago "recognized that 
States are not normal litigants for the purposes of invoking 
federal jurisdiction.,,137 Justice Stevens concluded, "must as 
Georgia's 'independent interest ... in all the earth and air within its 
domain' supported federal jurisdiction a century ago, so too does 
Massachusetts' well-founded desire to preserve its sovereign 
territory today.,,138 Justice Stevens also cited and quoted, as sug-
gestive authority, Justice Kennedy's majority opinion in Alden v. 
Maine, which "observ[ed] that in the federal system, the States 'are 
not relegated to the role of mere provinces or political corporations, 
but retain the dignity, though not the full authority, of sover-
eignty."'139 Additionally, the Court stated, "[t]hat Massachusetts 
does in fact own a great deal of the 'territory alleged to be affected' 
only reinforces the conclusion that its stake in the outcome of this 
case is sufficiently concrete to warrant the exercise of federal 
judicial power.,,140 
Justice Stevens explained that states have standing to protect 
their quasi-sovereign interest in the health and welfare of their 
citizens because they have surrendered three crucial sovereign 
powers to the federal government: (1) states may no longer use 
military force; (2) the Constitution prohibits states from negotiating 
treaties with foreign governments; and (3) federal laws may, in 
some circumstances, preempt states laws. 141 The federal government 
now enjoys those sovereign prerogatives.142 In recognition of all the 
powers that states have surrendered to the federal government, 
the Court instead has recognized that states can file suit in 
federal court to protect their quasi-sovereign interest in the 
137. [d. 
138. [d. (quoting Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907». 
139. [d. (quoting Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 715 (1999»; see also Streett, supra note 128. 
140. [d. (quoting Tenn. Copper, 206 U.S. at 237). 
141. See id. (''Massachusetts cannot invade Rhode Island to force reductions in greenhouse 
gas emissions, it cannot negotiate an emissions treaty with China or India, and in some 
circumstances the exercise of its police powers to reduce in· state motor· vehicle emissions 
might well be pre·empted."); see also Stevenson, supra note 3, at 5·8. 
142. Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1454. 
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health, welfare, and natural resources of their citizens.143 Although 
Tennessee Copper was not explicitly a standing case, Justice Stevens 
rejected Chief Justice Roberts' argument that the majority misread 
that 1907 case by observing that 
no less an authority than Hart & Wechsler's The Federal Courts 
and the Federal System understands Tennessee Copper as a 
standing decision. Indeed, it devotes an entire section to 
chronicling the long development of cases permitting States "to 
litigate as parens patriae to protect quasi-sovereign 
interests-i.e., public or governmental interests that concern the 
state as a whole."144 
The Court additionally stated that Congress required the EPA 
to use the federal government's sovereign powers to protect 
states, among others, from vehicle emissions "which in [the 
Administrator's] judgment cause, or contribute to, air pollution 
which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or 
welfare.,,145 Furthermore, Congress has "recognized a concomitant 
procedural right to challenge the rejection of its rule making petition 
as arbitrary and capricious.,,146 Justice Stevens concluded that 
"[g]iven that procedural right and Massachusetts' stake in 
protecting its quasi-sovereign interests, the Commonwealth is 
entitled to special solicitude in our standing analysis.,,147 He implied 
that the federal government owes states greater standing rights 
because states have surrendered sovereign powers to the federal 
government. 148 
143. Id. at 1454·55; see infra notes 147·48 and accompanying text. 
144. Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1455 n.17 (citing and quoting RICHARD H. FALLON ET AL., 
HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 289-90 (5th ed. 2003) 
(citation omitted». In a footnote, Chief Justice Roberts responded in his dissenting opinion: 
The Court seems to think we do not recognize that Tennessee Copper is a case 
about parens patriae standing, but we have no doubt about that. The point is 
that nothing in our cases (or Hart & Wechsler) suggests that the prudential 
requirements for parens patriae standing can somehow substitute for, or alter 
the content of, the "irreducible constitutional minimum" requirements ofinjury 
in fact, causation, and redressability under Article III. 
Id. at 1466 n.l (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
145. Id. at 1454 (majority opinion) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(I) (2000». 
146. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1) (2000». 
147. Id. at 1454-55. 
148. Id. 
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3. Massachusetts Meets the Tests for Injury, Causation, and 
Redressability 
The Court was ambiguous about whether Massachusetts satisfied 
normal standing requirements149 or met those requirements only 
because it was a state. In the paragraph after it declared that "the 
Commonwealth is entitled to special solicitude in our standing 
analysis,"150 the Court stated that "[w]ith that in mind, it is clear 
that petitioners' submissions as they pertain to Massachusetts have 
satisfied the most demanding standards of the adversarial 
process.,,151 The Court's use of the term "[w]ith that in mind" 
suggests that it was applying a special standing test for states. The 
D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals has interpreted Massachusetts as 
holding "that states receive 'special solicitude' in standing analysis, 
including analysis of imminence."152 Conversely, the majority's 
statement that the "petitioners' submissions as they pertain to 
Massachusetts have satisfied the most demanding standards of the 
adversarial process" arguably implies that Massachusetts could 
have met ordinary standing requirements. 153 
The Court declared that Massachusetts satisfied all three prongs 
of the standing test. Regarding the injury prong of standing, Justice 
Stevens determined that the "EPA's steadfast refusal to regulate 
greenhouse gas emissions presents a risk of harm to Massachusetts 
that is both 'actual' and 'imminent."'154 As to redressability, he 
concluded that there is "a 'substantial likelihood that the judicial 
relief requested' will prompt the EPA to take steps to reduce that 
risk."155 
149. See Jonathan Z. Cannon, The Significance of Massachusetts v. EPA, 93 VA. L. REV. IN 
BRIEF 53, 57 (2007), available at http://www.virginialawreview.orglinbriefl2007/05/21/ 
cannon.pdf(arguing that Justice Stevens' majority opinion in Massachusetts satisfied all three 
elements of the standing test because the Court was willing to consider systemic injury as a 
legitimate basis for standing). 
150. Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1454-55. 
151. [d. at 1455. 
152. Pub. Citizen, Inc. v. Nat'l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 489 F.3d 1279, 1294 n.2 
(D.C. Cir. 2007). 
153. See Cannon, supra note 149. 
154. Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1455 (majority opinion) (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of 
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992». 
155. [d. (quoting Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 79 
(1978». 
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As to the injury prong of the standing test, the majority opinion 
reviewed the petitioners' evidence and found that "[t]he harms 
associated with climate change are serious and well recognized."156 
In contrast to Judge Sentelle's conclusion that global warming 
involves a generalized grievance that is better addressed by the 
political branches,157 Justice Stevens stated, "[t]hat these climate-
change risks are 'widely shared' does not minimize Massachusetts' 
interest in the outcome of this litigation.,,158 He found compelling the 
evidence in "petitioners' unchallenged affidavits" that "global sea 
levels rose somewhere between 10 and 20 centimeters over the 20th 
century as a result of global warming" and that "[t]hese rising seas 
have already begun to swallow Massachusetts' coastal land."159 
Because Massachusetts "'owns a substantial portion of the state's 
coastal property,'" the majority opinion found that "it has alleged a 
particularized mJury in its capacity as a landowner."I60 
Furthermore, the Court found that "[t]he severity of that injury will 
only increase over the course of the next century" as sea levels 
continue to rise and that "[r]emediation costs alone, petitioners 
allege, could run well into the hundreds of millions of dollars."161 
As to the causation prong of the standing test, the Court found 
that the "EPA does not dispute the existence of a causal connection 
between man-made greenhouse gas emissions and global 
warming.,,162 Accordingly, the majority opinion concluded that "[a]t 
a minimum, therefore, EPA's refusal to regulate such emissions 
'contributes' to Massachusetts' injuries."163 Addressing the over-
lapping issues of causation and redressability, Justice Stevens 
rejected the EPA's arguments that "its decision not to regulate 
greenhouse gas emissions from new motor vehicles contributes so 
insignificantly to petitioners' injuries that the agency cannot be 
haled into federal court to answer for them" and that no "realistic 
156. [d. 
157. See supra Part II.B. 
158. Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1456 (quoting Fed. Election Comm'n v. Akins, 524 U.S. 
11,24 (1998) ("[W]here a harm is concrete, though widely shared, the Court has found 'injury 
in fact."'». 
159. [d. 
160. [d. (quoting the Declaration of Karst R. Hoogeboom, ~ 4). 
161. [d. 
162. [d. at 1457. 
163. [d. 
HeinOnline -- 49 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1732 2007-2008
1732 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49:1701 
possibility exists that the relief petitioners seek would mitigate 
global climate change and remedy their injuries."164 
The EPA next argued that federal courts could not redress the 
alleged harms to the petitioners from GHGs ''because predicted 
increases in greenhouse gas emissions from developing nations, 
particularly China and India, are likely to offset any marginal 
domestic decrease" that might result if the agency regulated GHGs 
from new vehicles. 165 The Court rejected the EPA's argument 
because it "rests on the erroneous assumption that a small 
incremental step, because it is incremental, can never be attacked 
in a federal judicial forum."166 Justice Stevens observed that 
agencies and legislatures "do not generally resolve massive 
problems in one fell regulatory sWOOp.,,167 He concluded, "[t]hat a first 
step might be tentative does not by itself support the notion that 
federal courts lack jurisdiction to determine whether that step 
conforms to law."168 
Rejecting the EPA's pessimistic assessment, the majority 
determined that "reducing domestic automobile emissions is hardly 
a tentative step" toward reducing GHG emissions.169 Because the 
United States transportation sector "accounts for more than 6% of 
worldwide carbon dioxide emissions," the Court concluded that ''U .S. 
motor-vehicle emissions make a meaningful contribution to 
greenhouse gas concentrations and hence, according to petitioners, 
to global warming."17o For these reasons, the majority found that the 
petitioners had met the causation portion of the standing test. 171 
In finding that the petitioners had satisfied the redressability 
part of the standing test, the Court observed that "[w]hile it may be 
true that regulating motor-vehicle emissions will not by itself 
reverse global warming, it by no means follows that we lack 
jurisdiction to decide whether EPA has a duty to take steps to slow 
or reduce it.,,172 Rejecting the argument that the EPA's regulation of 
164. Id. 
165. Id. 
166. Id. 
167. Id. 
168. Id. 
169. Id. 
170. Id. at 1457-58. 
171. See id. 
172. Id. at 1458. 
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GHG emissions from new vehicles would have little impact because 
it would not affect emissions from existing vehicles, the majority 
stated that "[b]ecause of the enormity of the potential consequences 
associated with man-made climate change, the fact that the 
effectiveness of a remedy might be delayed during the (relatively 
short) time it takes for a new motor-vehicle fleet to replace an older 
one is essentially irrelevant."173 Additionally, Justice Stevens 
rebuffed the argument that growing emissions from developing 
nations would eclipse any reductions from the EPA's regulation of 
vehicles, stating that "[a] reduction in domestic emissions would 
slow the pace of global emissions increases, no matter what happens 
elsewhere."174 The Court observed that the EPA and President Bush 
agreed that the United States should address the issue of global 
climate change and that the EPA gave "ardent support for various 
voluntary emission-reduction programs."175 The majority agreed 
with Judge Tatel's dissenting opinion that the "EPA would 
presumably not bother with such efforts if it thought emissions 
reductions would have no discernable impact on future global 
warming."176 
The Court concluded its discussion of the standing issue as 
follows: 
In sum-at least according to petitioners' uncontested affidavits 
-the rise in sea levels associated with global warming has 
already harmed and will continue to harm Massachusetts. The 
risk of catastrophic harm, though remote, is nevertheless real. 
That risk would be reduced to some extent if petitioners received 
the relief they seek. We therefore hold that petitioners have 
standing to challenge the EPA's denial of their rulemaking 
petition.177 
The Court's opinion is somewhat contradictory because it empha-
sized that the petitioners were entitled to the more lenient standing 
requirements for footnote seven procedural rights plaintiffs and that 
173. [d. 
174. [d. 
175. [d. 
176. [d. (quoting Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d 50, 66 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (Tatel, J., 
dissenting». 
177. [d. 
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Massachusetts was entitled to preferential standing as a state, 
while it simultaneously implied that Massachusetts had met normal 
standing requirements.17s The problem with the Court's dual 
approach is that it is not clear to what extent the Court altered its 
standing analysis because Massachusetts is a state rather than a 
private individual or because the Court applied a footnote seven 
analysis. For instance, it is uncertain whether an individual that 
owns large tracts of coastline property would have standing if he or 
she alleged the same facts because the Court never explains to 
what degree or how the standing analysis is different for states 
as opposed to individuals. The Court left many questions about 
standing unanswered for future courts. 
B. Chief Justice Roberts' Dissenting Opinion 
1. Massachusetts Lacks Standing Because Global Warming Is a 
Generalized Grievance 
Even assuming that global warming is a serious problem, Chief 
Justice Roberts, in his dissenting opinion, argued that it was a 
nonjusticiable general grievance that should be decided by the 
political branches rather than by the federal courts.179 He argued 
that it is inappropriate for the Court to apply a more generous 
standing test for states because there was no basis in the statute, 
precedent, or logic for a different standing test for states. ISO He 
emphasized that the CAA does not provide states with greater 
rights to sue than ordinary citizens. lSI Chief Justice Roberts argued: 
"Nor does the case law cited by the Court provide any support for 
the notion that Article III somehow implicitly treats public and 
private litigants differently."ls2 
178. See Cannon, supra note 149. 
179. See Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1463·64 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
180. See id. at 1464·66. 
181. See id. at 1464·65. 
182. Id. at 1465. 
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2. States Do Not Have Greater Standing Rights Under the 
Parens Patriae Doctrine 
1735 
Chief Justice Roberts acknowledged that Tennessee Copper "did 
indeed draw a distinction between a State and private litigants, but 
solely with respect to available remedies," giving Georgia the right 
to equitable relief when private litigants could obtain only a legal 
remedy.183 He argued that "[t]he case had nothing to do with Article 
III standing.,,184 He contended that "[i]n contrast to the present case, 
there was no question in Tennessee Copper about Article III 
injury.,,185 
Chief Justice Roberts argued that "Tennessee Copper has since 
stood for nothing more than a State's right, in an original 
jurisdiction action, to sue in a representative capacity as parens 
patriae"186 and that the parens patriae doctrine does not support 
giving states greater standing rights than individuals. 187 He 
contended that "[n]othing about a State's ability to sue in that 
capacity dilutes the bedrock requirement of showing injury, 
causation, and redress ability to satisfy Article III.,,188 He explained 
that "[a] claim of parens patriae standing is distinct from an 
allegation of direct injury" and "[fjar from being a substitute for 
Article III injury, parens patriae actions raise an additional hurdle 
for a state litigant: the articulation of a 'quasi-sovereign interest' 
'apart from the interests of particular private parties."'189 Chief 
Justice Roberts argued that "a State asserting quasi-sovereign 
interests as parens patriae must still show that its citizens satisfy 
Article III.,,190 Accordingly, he maintained that "[fjocusing on 
183. Id. 
184. Id. 
185. Id. 
186. Id. 
187. See id. at 1466. 
188. Id. at 1465. 
189. Id. (quoting Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592,607 
(1982»; cf. Snapp, 458 U.S. at 611 (Brennan, J., concurring) ("At the very least, the 
prerogative of a State to bring suits in federal court should be commensurate with the ability 
of private organizations."). But see MICHAEL L. WElLS ET AL., 2007 SUPPLEMENT TO CASES AND 
MATERIALS ON FEDERAL COURTS 38 (2007) (questioning Chief Justice Roberts' assertion that 
states in parens patriae suits have to meet additional requirements for standing and 
suggesting that a state's quasi-sovereign interest alone is sufficient for standing). 
190. Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1465. 
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Massachusetts' interests as quasi-sovereign makes the required 
showing here harder, not easier."191 
More broadly, Chief Justice Roberts complained that "[t]he Court, 
in effect, takes what has always been regarded as a necessary 
condition for parens patriae standing-a quasi-sovereign interest 
-and converts it into a sufficient showing for purposes of Article 
III."192 His charge has some truth if one looks at the narrow holdings 
of various parens patriae decisions. As Part IV of this Article will 
show, if one looks at the broader theoretical rationale for protecting 
the quasi-sovereign interests of states, however, the majority's use 
of the quasi-sovereign doctrine to broaden the standing rights of 
states makes sense.193 
Chief Justice Roberts did point out a potential flaw in the Court's 
use of the quasi-sovereign parens patriae standing doctrine. He 
observed that "[t]he Court asserts that Massachusetts is entitled to 
'special solicitude' due to its 'quasi-sovereign interests,' ... but then 
applies our Article III standing test to the asserted injury of the 
State's loss of coastal property ... 'in its capacity as a landowner."'194 
Chief Justice Roberts correctly observed that "[i]n the context of 
parens patriae standing, however, we have characterized state 
ownership of land as a 'nonsovereign interes[t]' because a State 'is 
likely to have the same interests as other similarly situated 
proprietors."'195 
Chief Justice Roberts was correct that the majority confuses the 
distinction between quasi-sovereign interests and property 
interests. Some of Massachusetts' coast, however, is not owned by 
the State, and the Commonwealth would have a quasi-sovereign 
interest in that property. Additionally, Massachusetts has a more 
general quasi-sovereign interest in protecting the health and 
welfare of its citizens from harms to its coastline caused by 
global warming.196 Thus, the Court was correct in holding that 
Massachusetts has both a quasi-sovereign interest and a property 
191. Id. 
192. Id. at 1465-66. 
193. See infra Part IV. 
194. Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1466 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (quoting id. at 1455-56 
(majority opinion». 
195. Id. (quoting Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rei. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 601 
(1982». 
196. Watts & Wildermuth, supra note 4 (manuscript at 7). 
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interest in its coastline, but the majority opinion did not explain 
that clearly. 
Citing the Court's 1923 Massachusetts v. Mellon197 decision and 
a footnote in the 1982 Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex 
rel. Barez198 decision, Chief Justice Roberts also argued that a state 
generally may not assert a quasi-sovereign interest against the 
federal government.199 He observed that neither the petitioners nor 
the numerous amici supporting the petitioners had ever "cited 
Tennessee Copper in their briefs before this Court or the D.C. 
Circuit" and speculated that was because of the Mellon limitation on 
parens patriae standing.20o Professor Adler argues that "[t]he 
simplest explanation for Georgia's conspicuous absence from the 
briefing is that the decision does not support the proposition for 
which it was cited."201 
In a footnote, the majority opinion defended its reliance on 
Tennessee Copper and distinguished Mellon. Quoting its 1945 
decision in Georgia v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., the Massachusetts 
Court stated that "there is a critical difference between allowing a 
State 'to protect her citizens from the operation of federal statutes' 
(which is what Mellon prohibits) and allowing a State to assert its 
rights under federal law (which it has standing to do)."202 The 
Court's 1945 Georgia decision allowed a state to bring a parens 
patriae action against a private party for alleged violations of 
federal antitrust laws and arguably limited Mellon to prohibiting 
states from filing parens patriae suits that challenge the 
constitutionality of a federal statute.203 The Court concluded that 
197. 262 u.s. 447 (1923). 
198. 458 u.s. 592 (1982). 
199. Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1466 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (citing Mellon, 262 U.S. 
at 485-86; Snapp, 458 U.S. at 610 n.16). 
200. [d. 
201. Adler, supra note 3, at 65. 
202. Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1455 n.17 (majority opinion) (quoting Georgia v. Pa. R.R. 
Co., 324 U.S. 439, 447 (1945». 
203. See Georgia, 324 U.S. at 445-47; see also Connecticut ex reI. Blumenthal v. U.S. Dep't 
of Commerce, 369 F. Supp. 2d 237, 245 n.B (D. Conn. 2005); P.R. Pub. Hous. Admin. v. U.S. 
Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 59 F. Supp. 2d 310,326 (D.P.R. 1999); Kansas v. United States, 
748 F. Supp. 797, 802 (D. Kan. 1990); Abrams v. Heckler, 582 F. Supp. 1155, 1159-60 
(S.D.N.Y. 1984); Comment, State Standing To Challenge Federal Administrative Action: A Re-
examination of the Parens Patriae Doctrine, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 1069, 1089-93 (1977) ("Even 
assuming Mellon's continued validity as a bar to state parens patriae suits which allege the 
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Massachusetts was properly asserting its quasi-sovereign interest 
to require the federal government to enforce the CAA.204 In a 
footnote, Chief Justice Roberts argued, in turn, that a state could 
"assert rights under a federal statute as parens patriae" against 
private parties, but not against the federal government.205 He also 
relied on Alfred L. Snapp & Son's "clear ruling that '[a] State does 
not have standing as parens patriae to bring an action against the 
Federal Government.",206 The majority opinion, however, cited a 
subsequent parens patriae case in which the Court allowed a cross-
claim against the United States.207 Although they are not discussed 
in the Supreme Court's decision, Part IV will address some lower 
court decisions that have allowed states to file parens patriae suits 
against the federal government.208 
It seems most likely that Justice Kennedy suggested that the 
majority rely on Tennessee Copper. The petitioners did not cite 
Tennessee Copper in their briefs.209 Arizona and four other states 
filed an amicus brief in which they argued that states should have 
standing to sue when the decision of a federal agency, including the 
EPA's decision in that case, may preempt their state laws regulating 
G H Gs. 210 The preemption argument is based on the state's sovereign 
unconstitutionality of a statute, many courts have begun to distinguish such suits from state 
parens patriae suits that seek review of federal agency action allegedly inconsistent with a 
federal statute."). 
204. See Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1455 n.17. 
205. Id. at 1466 n.l (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
206. Id. (quoting Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rei. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 610 
n.16 (1982». 
207. See id. at 1455 n.17 (majority opinion) (citing Nebraska v. Wyoming, 515 U.S. 1,20 
(1995) (holding that Wyoming had standing to bring a cross-claim against the United States 
to vindicate its '"quasi-sovereign' interests which are 'independent of and behind the titles of 
its citizens, in all the earth and air within its domain.",». 
208. See infra note 386 and accompanying text. 
209. See Adler, supra note 3, at 65. 
210. See Brief of the States of Arizona, Iowa, Maryland, Minnesota and Wisconsin as Amici 
Curiae in Support of Petitioners at **20-25, Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007) 
(No. 05-1120), 2006 WL 2563380 [hereinafter Arizona Amicus Brief]; see also Stevenson, supra 
note 3, at 32-36 (agreeing with Arizona Amicus Brief that states should have standing to sue 
when the decision of a federal agency, including EPA's decision in that case, may preempt 
their state laws regulating GHGs); Watts & Wildermuth, supra note 4 (manuscript at 2, 6-7, 
9-11). The Arizona Amicus Brief relied on four lower court decisions, but no Supreme Court 
precedent for the principle that a state has standing to challenge a federal statute or 
regulation that potentially preempts a state law. See Arizona Amicus Brief, supra, at **22-23; 
see also Alaska v. U.S. Dep't of Transp., 868 F.2d 441, 443 (D.C. Gir. 1989); Ohio ex rei. 
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interest in enacting its own laws rather than the quasi-sovereign 
interest relied on in Tennessee Copper.2l1 Massachusetts and the 
other petitioners cited the Arizona brief in their brief.212 During the 
oral argument before the Supreme Court, James R. Milkey, an 
assistant attorney general for Massachusetts and the petitioners' 
only oral advocate before the Court, made a standing argument 
based on preemption by claiming that states have "special standing" 
to challenge federal laws or regulations that potentially preempt 
state laws.213 During the oral argument, Justice Ginsburg explicitly 
agreed with the standing argument in the Arizona brief,214 but the 
preemption standing line of reasoning was not mentioned in the 
Court's decision.215 
Instead, during the oral argument in the case, Justice Kennedy 
stated that Tennessee Copper was the petitioners' "best case" 
supporting their standing, although he also remarked that the 
decision was "pre-Massachusetts versus Mellon."216 Justice Kennedy 
has strongly supported federalism and state rights since he was 
Celebrezze v. u.s. Dep't of Transp., 766 F.2d 228,232·33 (6th Cir. 1985); Conference of State 
Bank Supervisors v. Conover, 710 F.2d 878, 880 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Florida v. Weinberger, 
492 F.2d 488,494 (5th Cir. 1974); Stevenson, supra note 3, at 32·36; Watts & Wildermuth, 
supra note 4 (manuscript at 7 n.43). 
211. See Watts & Wildermuth, supra note 4 (manuscript at 9-11). 
212. See Arizona Amicus Brief, supra note 210, at 6 n.5. 
213. Transcript of Oral Argument at **14-17, Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007) 
(No. 05-1120), 2006 WL 3431932 [hereinafter Oral Argument] (statement of James R. Milkey, 
Assistant Attorney General for Massachusetts, for Petitioners, citing the Arizona brief and 
a case from the court of appeals); see also West Virginia v. EPA, 362 F.3d 861, 868 (D.C. Cir. 
2004); Stevenson, supra note 3, at 29-31. 
214. See Oral Argument, supra note 213, at **16-17. 
215. See Stevenson, supra note 3, at 35 (stating that the Massachusetts decision did not cite 
any cases in the Arizona brief); Watts & Wildermuth, supra note 4 (manuscript at 11) 
("Because the CAA allows California to create its own laws with respect to motor vehicle 
emissions and other states to adopt those standards, we think the Court should have 
examined whether California and the piggy-backing states had a sovereign interest at stake 
in this case. If the Court concluded that there was a sovereign interest at stake, as we believe 
there is, there would have been no need for any state to satisfy the Lujan requirements and 
thus no need to create a Lujan-lite analysis for states."). 
216. Oral Argument, supra note 213, at *15 (statement of Justice Kennedy); Thomas J. 
Donlon, Supreme Court Boldly Steps into Global Warming Debate, ABA News & 
Developments: E-Flash for April 2007, http://www.abanet.org/litigation/committees/appellate/ 
news_0407.html ("Apparently, the [Tennessee Copper] case was first raised by Justice 
Kennedy at oral argument."); Douglas T. Kendall & Jennifer Bradley, How Environmentalists 
Can Win Over the Supreme Court, NEW REPUBLIC ONLINE, Dec. 1, 2006, at 1, http://www. 
communityrights.orglPDFslTheNewRep 12.01.06.pdf; Mauro, supra note 128. 
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appointed to the Court by President Reagan in 1988.217 He likely 
was attracted to Tennessee Copper as a justification for standing 
because that case strongly supports the rights of states.218 
Although Chief Justice Roberts' discussion of Tennessee Copper is 
technically accurate, the implications of that decision are broader 
than he concedes. Tennessee Copper was decided thirty-seven years 
before the Court first explicitly used a standing test in Stark v. 
Wickard,219 so it is not surprising that Justice Holmes did not 
even mention the issue of standing.220 As is discussed in Part IV, 
Tennessee Copper gave states broader remedies than private 
litigants based on the principle that states have broader rights 
when they protect quasi-sovereign interests than private litigants 
have in suing for private interests.221 
3. Massachusetts Failed To Prove Injury, Causation, or 
Redressability 
Chief Justice Roberts argued that the Court did not explain 
how its "special solicitude" for Massachusetts affected its standing 
217. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 754 (1999) (holding that states retain residual 
sovereignty under a federalist system and therefore Congress may not subject non·consenting 
states to private suits for damages in state courts); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 583 
(1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (interpreting the Commerce Clause in light of federalist 
concerns); Blumm & Bosse, supra note 128, at 672·73, 703·04, 715·18, 722 (arguing that 
federalism and states' rights are a central theme in Justice Kennedy's jurisprudence); Kendall 
& Bradley, supra note 216, at 2 (''To Justice Kennedy, the [Massachusetts] case seems to turn 
instead on the political theory of James Madison."); Dawn Reeves & Lara Beaven, Justice 
Kennedy Fulfills Role as Key but Elusive Environmental Vote, INSIDE EPA, June 29, 2007, 
http://www.insideepa.com (subscription required) (reporting unidentified "high court expert" 
as stating that Justice Kennedy generally supports the position of states in environmental 
cases before the Court during the 2006·07 term). Some argue that Justice Kennedy takes a 
"pragmatic" approach to federalist concerns. See Ann Althouse, Enforcing Federalism After 
United States v. Lopez, 38 ARIz. L. REV. 793, 801·04 (1996); Stephen R. McAllister, Is There 
a Judicially Enforceable Limit to Congressional Power Under the Commerce Clause?, 44 U. 
KAN. L. REV. 217, 238·42 (1996). 
218. See Kendall & Bradley, supra note 216, at 1·2 (arguing that Justice Kennedy stated 
that Tennessee Copper was the "best" standing precedent in the Massachusetts case because 
the former case is based on the principle that states have greater rights than individual 
citizens in our federalist system of government). 
219. 321 U.S. 288, 310 (1944). 
220. See Mank, supra note 9, at 22 (discussing the history of the Court's use of standing 
criteria). 
221. See infra Part IV.G. 
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analysis, "except as an implicit concession that petitioners cannot 
establish standing on traditional terms.,,222 He asserted that "the 
status of Massachusetts as a State cannot compensate for 
petitioners' failure to demonstrate injury in fact, causation, and 
redressability."223 Chief Justice Roberts first asserted that the 
petitioners' injuries from global warming failed to meet Lujan's 
requirement that the alleged injury be "particularized" because they 
were common to the public at large.224 He also argued that the 
petitioners' evidence that rising sea levels was insufficient to 
establish that the injury is "actual or imminent, not conjectural or 
hypothetical,,225 because the computer modeling program relied upon 
by the plaintiffs had a significant range of uncertainty.226 In a 
footnote, the majority responded that the petitioners did not have 
to prove the amount of loss with exactitude, but merely had to 
demonstrate that it was likely that rising sea levels would result in 
the loss of some of Massachusetts' coastline.227 Additionally, Chief 
Justice Roberts argued that, even if the models were correct about 
the loss of coastline, the injury was not immediate if its full effects 
would not be felt until 2100.228 He stated: "[A]ccepting a century-
long time horizon and a series of compounded estimates renders 
requirements of imminence and immediacy utterly toothless.,,229 
Additionally, Chief Justice Roberts argued that the petitioners 
failed to prove that a causal connection existed between the alleged 
injury of loss of coastal land in Massachusetts and "the lack of new 
motor vehicle greenhouse gas emission standards.,,230 Because GHGs 
persist in the atmosphere "for anywhere from 50 to 200 years" and 
"domestic motor vehicles contribute about 6 percent of global 
carbon dioxide emissions and 4 percent of global greenhouse gas 
222. Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Qt. 1438, 1466 (2007) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
223. Id. at 1466-67. 
224. See id. at 1467. 
225. Id. 
226. See id. at 1467-68 (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992»; 
accord Bertagna, supra note 10, at 444-46 ("Global warming plaintiffs cannot take their 
imminent injury claims out of the speculative category, because their claims are based 
entirely on conjectural, complex systems of climate modeling."). 
227. See Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1456 n.21 (majority opinion). 
228. See id. at 1468 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); Adler, supra note 3, at 68. 
229. Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1468 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); see Adler, supra note 3, 
at 67-68. 
230. Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1468-69. 
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emissions," the petitioners' request that the EPA regulate emissions 
from "new motor vehicles and new motor vehicle engines" would 
have only a tiny impact on total global GHGs.231 He concluded: 
In light of the bit-part domestic new motor vehicle greenhouse 
gas emissions have played in what petitioners describe as a 150-
year global phenomenon, and the myriad additional factors 
bearing on petitioners' alleged injury-the loss of Massachusetts 
coastal land-the connection is far too speculative to establish 
causation.232 
By contrast, the majority rejected similar arguments by the EPA 
and concluded instead that the petitioners had established cau-
sation because "U.S. motor-vehicle emissions make a meaningful 
contribution to greenhouse gas concentrations and hence, according 
to petitioners, to global warming."233 
Finally, Chief Justice Roberts argued that "[r]edressability is 
even more problematic" because of the "tenuous link between 
petitioners' alleged injury and the indeterminate fractional 
domestic emissions at issue here" and the additional problem that 
the "petitioners cannot meaningfully predict what will come of the 
80 percent of global greenhouse gas emissions that originate outside 
the United States."234 He criticized the petitioners' claim that other 
countries would follow the lead of the United States ifit reduced its 
motor vehicle emissions because that assertion ignored the impact 
of cost on other nations' decisions and that U.S. courts would have 
no authority to force other countries to reduce their emissions.235 
Chief Justice Roberts rejected the majority's conclusion that "any 
decrease in domestic emissions will 'slow the pace of global 
emissions increases, no matter what happens elsewhere.",236 
The Chief Justice argued that the Court's reasoning failed to 
satisfy the three-part standing test's requirement that a court find 
that it is ''likely'' that a remedy will redress the "particular injury in 
231. Id. 
232. Id. at 1469. 
233. Id. at 1457-58 (majority opinion); see supra text accompanying notes 165-71. 
234. Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1469 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
235. See id. at 1469-70. 
236. Id. at 1470 (quoting id. at 1458 (majority opinion». 
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fact" at issue.237 He complained that "even if regulation does reduce 
emissions-to some indeterminate degree, given events elsewhere 
in the world-the Court never explains why that makes it likely 
that the injury in fact-the loss of land-will be redressed."238 By 
contrast, the Court concluded that the petitioners met the 
redressability and other standing requirements because reducing 
domestic emissions would reduce the loss of land and the risk of 
catastrophic harm to some extent.239 Implicitly, Chief Justice 
Roberts appeared to demand that the petitioners quantify, at least 
to some extent, how much land might be saved by the EPA's 
regulation of emissions from new vehicles and new engines to 
establish standing. The majority, however, was satisfied that the 
petitioners had shown that such regulation would reduce the risk to 
the Massachusetts coastline from rising sea levels resulting from 
GHGs and higher temperatures, despite the uncertainties about 
how much land the EPA's regulation of new vehicles would save. 
The disagreement between the majority and Chief Justice Roberts' 
minority opinion demonstrates that the Court's standing test is 
far from precise and can be applied in different ways by different 
judges. 
4. Chief Justice Roberts Accuses the Majority of Intruding upon 
the Role of the Political Branches 
Chief Justice Roberts acknowledged that different judges 
could sometimes reasonably "debate" the application of imprecise 
standing standards, such as what is '"fairly' traceable or 'likely' to 
be redressed.,,240 He contended, however, that the Court's loose 
application of standing principles in this case failed to consider 
separation of powers principles limiting the judiciary to "concrete 
cases.,,241 He argued that the majority's recognition of standing in a 
case involving broad policy issues results in the Court intruding 
upon policy decisions appropriately within the purview of the 
237.Id. 
238.Id. 
239. See id. at 1458 (majority opinion). See supra Part III.A.3. 
240. Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1470 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
241. Id. 
HeinOnline -- 49 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1744 2007-2008
1744 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49:1701 
political branches of government.242 Chief Justice Roberts implied 
that the right of citizens to elect representatives to Congress and a 
President is an adequate answer to any sovereign rights that states 
surrender without expanding the rights of states to have standing 
in the federal courts.243 
Chief Justice Roberts argued that "[t]oday's decision recalls the 
previous high-water mark of diluted standing requirements, United 
States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures 
(SCRAP).,,244 He summarized SCRAP as follows: 
In SCRAP, the Court based an environmental group's 
standing to challenge a railroad freight rate surcharge on the 
group's allegation that increases in railroad rates would cause 
an increase in the use of nonrecyclable goods, resulting in the 
increased need for natural resources to produce such goods. 
According to the group, some of these resources might be taken 
from the Washington area, resulting in increased refuse that 
might find its way into area parks, harming the group's 
members.245 
The Court has never expressly overruled SCRAP, but in its 1990 
decision Whitmore v. Arkansas,246 the Court strongly questioned its 
rationale, stating that SCRAP involved "[p]robably the most 
attenuated injury conferring Art. III standing" and "surely went to 
the very outer limit of the law.,,247 Chief Justice Roberts agreed that 
"[t]he difficulty with SCRAP, and the reason it has not been 
followed ... is the attenuated nature of the injury there.,,248 He 
argued that "SCRAP became emblematic not of the looseness of 
Article III standing requirements, but of how utterly manipulable 
they are if not taken seriously as a matter of judicial self-
restraint."249 He continued, "SCRAP made standing seem a lawyer's 
242. See id. at 1470·71. 
243. See id. at 1463·64 (arguing that the majority had usurped the authority of political 
branches by unduly expanding standing rights of states). 
244. [d. at 1470 (citing 412 U.S. 669 (1973». 
245. [d. at 1471. 
246. 495 U.S. 149 (1990). 
247. [d. at 158·59; see Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 889 (1990) (stating that 
SCRAP ''has never since been emulated by this Court"). 
248. Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1471 n.2 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
249. Id. at 1471. 
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game, rather than a fundamental limitation ensuring that courts 
function as courts and not intrude on the politically accountable 
branches.,,25o He concluded, ''Today's decision is SCRAP for a new 
generation.,,251 
In a footnote, the majority responded to Chief Justice Roberts' 
comparison ofthe case to SCRAP. First, the Court observed that he 
did not "disavow this portion of Justice Stewart's opinion for the 
Court" in which the SCRAP Court had stated "that standing is not 
to be denied simply because many people suffer the same injury .... 
To deny standing to persons who are in fact injured simply because 
many others are also injured, would mean that the most injurious 
and widespread Government actions could be questioned by 
nobody.,,252 In a footnote, Chief Justice Roberts agreed that the 
portion of the SCRAP decision quoted by the Court was not 
problematic, but "[r]ather it is the attenuated nature of the injury 
there.,,253 The majority also challenged Chief Justice Roberts' claim 
that the Court had followed SCRAP in making standing a "lawyer's 
game.,,254 The majority responded: "It is moreover quite wrong to 
analogize the legal claim advanced by Massachusetts and the other 
public and private entities who challenge EPA's parsimonious 
construction ofthe Clean Air Act to a mere 'lawyer's game.",255 Chief 
Justice Roberts responded in turn that "[o]f course it is not the legal 
challenge that is merely 'an ingenious academic exercise in the 
conceivable,' but the assertions made in support of standing."256 
In the concluding paragraph of his dissent, Chief Justice Roberts 
argued that the Court implicitly recognized that the petitioners 
could not meet normal standing criteria when the majority 
"devise[d] a new doctrine of state standing to support its result.,,257 
He saw a small silver lining in an otherwise bad standing decision, 
stating: ''The good news is that the Court's 'special solicitude' for 
250. [d. 
251. [d. 
252. [d. at 1458 n.24 (majority opinion) (quoting United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669 
687·88 (1973». 
253. [d. at 1471 n.2 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
254. [d. at 1471. 
255. [d. at 1459 n.24 (majority opinion) (quoting id. at 1471 n.2 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting». 
256. [d. at 1471 n.2 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (quoting SCRAP, 412 U.S. at 688 (citation 
omitted». 
257. Id. at 1471. 
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Massachusetts limits the future applicability of the diluted standing 
requirements applied in this case.,,258 Conversely, he concluded, 
"[t]he bad news is that the Court's self-professed relaxation of 
those Article III requirements has caused us to transgress 'the 
proper-and properly limited-role of the courts in a democratic 
society."'259 
C. Analysis 
A major weakness in the Court's opinion is that it never explained 
to what extent it had relaxed standing requirements for states. It 
provided little or no guidance to lower courts about the degree to 
which they should give "special solicitude" to states in deciding 
standing issues.26o The majority opinion is murky about how much 
extra deference states should receive with regard to standing, 
because the Court was unwilling to acknowledge that the 
petitioners failed to meet any part of the three-prong standing test. 
Additionally, the Court invoked the more relaxed immediacy and 
redressability requirements for procedural rights cases under 
footnote seven of Lujan, but did not explain how much more 
relaxed those requirements are compared to substantive cases.261 
Furthermore, because the case involved both procedural and 
substantive issues, it is at least questionable whether the case is a 
procedural rights action entitled to the relaxed footnote seven 
analysis. 
1. The Court Does Not Provide a Clear Test for State 
Standing 
The Court never clearly explained whether the petitioners could 
have met the three-part standing test without the benefit of the 
special standing position of states. Chief Justice Roberts' argument 
that the majority's approach of giving states special standing rights 
was an implicit admission that the petitioners could not meet 
258. Id. (quoting id. at 1455 (majority opinion». 
259. Id. (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984». 
260. See id. at 1454-55 (majority opinion). 
261. See id. at 1453. 
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ordinary standing principles has some truth,262 but the Court's 
opinion is more complicated. The majority appears to have it both 
ways: The Court argued that the petitioners met the three-part 
standing test, but also suggested that if there are any doubts about 
whether they have met any facet of the test, then Massachusetts as 
a state will receive the benefit of the doubt.263 
The majority opinion is also somewhat unclear about which kind 
of state interests are entitled to special standing analysis. The Court 
made a strong argument that states deserve special protection of 
quasi-sovereign interests because they have surrendered aspects of 
their sovereignty to the United States, and, therefore, can no longer 
defend the interests in the health and welfare of their citizens 
through war or diplomacy.264 Yet the Court also observed that the 
fact that Massachusetts owned a great deal of the coastline 
strengthened the argument that it had a concrete stake in the 
case.265 On the whole, the Court's opinion most strongly supports the 
view that states deserve special protection of quasi-sovereign 
interests in parens patriae cases. However the opinion does not 
necessarily establish that states are entitled to special standing 
rights in cases in which they are a mere property owner comparable 
to an ordinary citizen. 
2. It Is Questionable Whether Massachusetts Is a Procedural 
Rights Plaintiff, but the Court Has Never Provided a Good 
Definition of When Footnote Seven Applies 
Commentators have predicted that it would be easier for plaintiffs 
asserting global warming claims to prove standing in a procedural 
rights case, such as a NEPA action, than in a substantive case, 
including tort or nuisance actions, because of the relaxed immediacy 
and redress ability requirements for procedural rights plaintiffs 
under Lujan's footnote seven.266 For example, one commentator 
262. [d. at 1466 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
263. See id. at 1454·55 (majority opinion). 
264. See id. at 1454. 
265. [d. 
266. See Bertagna, supra note 10, at 456·58 (arguing that substantive global warming 
claims are unlikely to meet standing requirements, but that procedural rights cases under 
NEPA have a better chance of meeting standing requirements); Bradford C. Mank, Civil 
Remedies, in GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE & U.S. LAw 183, 184·99, 215·19, 237·38 (Michael B. 
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argued that "[t]he principal way in which the relaxed standards of 
procedural standing assist global warming plaintiffs is by allowing 
them to allege an injury that will occur in the future.,,267 In footnote 
seven, the Lujan Court stated that a NEPA plaintiff could challenge 
a dam that might not be completed "for many years."268 In 
Massachusetts, the petitioners presented estimates of damage to 
Massachusetts' coastline through 2100;269 such information would 
only meet the relaxed immediacy requirements under footnote 
seven for procedural rights plaintiffs and not for normal standing 
requirements.27o Additionally, according to some lower court 
decisions and commentators, the standard for redressability is 
relaxed for procedural rights plaintiffs; this view holds that these 
plaintiffs do not have to prove that a favorable decision from the 
court will "fully remedy" their injuries.271 Thus, it is not surprising 
that the majority in Massachusetts characterized the petitioners' 
action as procedural in nature on the grounds that the petitioners 
were challenging the EPA's refusal to act on their petition under 42 
U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1), which provides "the right to challenge agency 
action unlawfully withheld.,,272 
Professor Adler, however, argues that the majority inap-
propriately applied the relaxed standing analysis because 
"Massachusetts claimed substantive injury, for which it sought 
Gerrard ed., 2007) (arguing that the Ninth Circuit, and probably the Eighth and Tenth 
Circuits, would accept NEPA suits raising global warming issues, but that the District of 
Columbia Circuit applied stricter standing approach even in procedural rights cases). 
267. Bertagna, supra note 10, at 460. 
268. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 572 n.7 (1992); see also Bertagna, supra 
note 10, at 461. 
269. See Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1456 n.20; id. at 1467-68 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) 
(criticizing Massachusetts' use of estimates of sea level rise through 2100); see also Adler, 
supra note 3, at 67-68. 
270. See Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1467-68 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that 
Massachusetts' evidence of estimated sea level rise did not satisfy the immediacy test for 
standing); Adler, supra note 3, at 67-68. 
271. Colo. Envtl. Coal. v. Wenker, 353 F.3d 1221, 1240 (10th Cir. 2004) (applying relaxed 
standing analysis for redressability in a procedural rights case); Pye v. United States, 269 
F.3d 459, 471 (4th Cir. 2001); Hall v. Norton, 266 F.3d 969,977 (9th Cir. 2001) (stating that 
a procedural rights plaintiff meets redressability requirement if the challenged project "could 
be influenced" by the court's decision); Bertagna, supra note 10, at 463-64. 
272. Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1453 (majority opinion) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1) 
(2000»; see also id. at 1454 (stating that "Congress has moreover recognized a concomitant 
procedural right to challenge the rejection of its rulemaking petition as arbitrary and 
capricious" (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1) (2000»). 
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substantive relief.,,273 Professor Adler apparently would limit the 
relaxed standing analysis in footnote seven of Lujan to solely 
procedural actions such as those under NEP A. 274 Whether the Court 
was right to apply footnote seven analysis, or whether Professor 
Adler is right, is complicated because the Court has never clearly 
defined under what circumstances the relaxed immediacy and 
redressability requirements for procedural rights plaintiffs apply. 
In applying Lujan's standing test, Professor Buzbee has argued 
that "[t]he line between substantive and procedural agency errors 
is unclear.,,275 He observes that "[e]xactly what a 'procedural rights' 
injury or harm is remains foggy."276 In his Lujan dissent, Justice 
Blackmun, who was joined by Justice O'Connor, criticized the 
majority's procedural rights distinction by stating that "[m]ost 
governmental conduct can be classified as 'procedural.",277 
Additionally, he observed that "[i]n complex regulatory areas ... 
Congress often legislates ... in procedural shades of gray .... [I]t sets 
forth substantive policy goals and provides for their attainment by 
requiring Executive Branch officials to follow certain procedures, for 
example, in the form of reporting, consultation, and certification 
requirements.'0278 
Professor Buzbee maintains that many cases in which 
administrative agencies are defendants "occurD in the context of 
intermediate government actions."279 He explains, "I mean actions 
short of the final step in the decision-making process created by a 
relevant enabling act. Part of a statutory sequence of steps may be 
complete, but other decisions and actions must occur before final 
choices are made and tangible results impacting a plaintiff 
follow.,,280 In Bennett v. Spear,281 the Court treated the government's 
intermediate steps in deciding whether certain habitat was "critical 
273. Adler, supra note 3, at 68. 
274. See id. 
275. Buzbee, supra note 73, at 255 n.33. 
276. Buzbee, supra note 83, at 793 n.148. 
277. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 601 (1992) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); 
see also Buzbee, supra note 83, at 793 n.148; Buzbee, supra note 73, at 255 n.33. 
278. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 602 (Blackmun; J., dissenting); see also Buzbee, supra note 83, at 
793 n.148; Buzbee, supra note 73, at 255 n.33. 
279. Buzbee, supra note 73, at 255 n.33. 
280. [d. 
281. 520 U.S. 154 (1997). 
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habitat" used by endangered species as procedural omissions even 
though the statute ultimately required the Secretary of Interior to 
make a substantive decision.282 The Bennett Court stated: ''It is 
rudimentary administrative law that discretion as to the substance 
of the ultimate decision does not confer discretion to ignore the 
required procedures of decision making .... Since it is the omission of 
these required procedures that petitioners complain of, their [16 
U.S. C.] § 1533 claim is reviewable under § 1540(g)(1)(C).,,283 
Although Professor Buzbee is critical of the Bennett Court's 
approach of dividing procedural and substantive steps that are 
ultimately substantive in nature,284 Bennett is arguably precedent 
for applying the Lujan footnote seven standing test by treating a 
case with intermediate procedural steps as a procedural rights case 
even though the agency must ultimately decide a substantive 
issue.285 
In Massachusetts, the petitioners of the Act sought, under Section 
202, both procedural action by the EPA in determining whether CO2 
is "reasonably ... anticipated to endanger public health or welfare," 
and substantive action in regulating emissions from new vehicles. 286 
The procedural and substantive aspects of Section 202 are 
intertwined because, as the majority stated, "[i]f EPA makes a 
finding of endangerment, the Clean Air Act requires the agency to 
regulate emissions of the deleterious pollutant from new motor 
vehicles.,,287 Yet in the conclusion of the opinion, the Court simply 
required the EPA to fulfill its procedural duty to explain its 
reasons for not taking action, and did not require the agency to 
take substantive action. "In short, EPA has offered no reasoned 
explanation for its refusal to decide whether greenhouse gases cause 
or contribute to climate change. Its action was therefore 'arbitrary, 
capricious, '" or otherwise not in accordance with law.",288 The Court 
effectively stated that the EPA must fulfill its procedural duties 
282. See id. at 172; Buzbee, supra note 83, at 793 n.148. 
283. Bennett, 520 U.S. at 172 (internal citations omitted); see also Buzbee, supra note 83, 
at 793 n.148. 
284. See Buzbee, supra note 83, at 793 n.148. See generally id. at 793·98, 800·09, 811·23 
(discussing procedural and substantive aspects of Bennett). 
285. See Bennett, 520 U.S. at 172; Buzbee, supra note 83, at 793 n.148. 
286. 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (2000). 
287. Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1462 (2007) (majority opinion). 
288. Jd. at 1463 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(9)(A) (2000». 
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under Section 202, but did not address to what extent the Court 
would require the agency to make any substantive determinations. 
However, the majority went on to note: 
We need not and do not reach the question whether on remand 
EPA must make an endangerment finding, or whether policy 
concerns can inform EPA's actions in the event that it makes 
such a finding .... We hold only that EPA must ground its reasons 
for action or inaction in the statute.289 
Following Bennett and Professor Buzbee's intermediate step 
analysis, the Massachusetts Court's order could be construed as 
simply requiring the EPA to take an intermediate procedural action 
in explaining its reasoning for denying the petition. Arguably, 
footnote seven standing could apply in Massachusetts because ofthe 
intermediate procedural steps in the case even though the EPA may 
eventually need to make a substantive decision.290 
Because the Massachusetts decision only required the EPA to take 
an "intermediate procedural" step in explaining its reasoning for 
denying the petition,291 the Court's characterization of the case as 
procedural in nature is arguably correct. Nevertheless, Professor 
Adler is right to question the majority's assertion that the case is a 
procedural rights challenge that neatly fits under footnote seven of 
the Lujan decision. The Court needs to develop a better analysis for 
whether Lujan footnote seven standing applies to a case that 
involves intermediate procedural steps and an ultimate substantive 
decision. 
The Court might have decided the case in favor of the petitioners 
without invoking footnote seven's relaxed standing requirements for 
procedural rights plaintiffs. It is worth noting that Judge Tatel 
concluded that Massachusetts met all of the standing requirements 
289. Id. (internal citations omitted). 
290. Professor Adler acknowledges that the Court's decision technically only requires the 
EPA to reconsider its decision, but then argues that "the adoption of new vehicle emission 
standards is only a matter of time" because the Bush Administration and EPA have already 
conceded that GHGs pose serious risks of climate change. Jonathan H. Adler, Massachusetts 
v. EPA Heats Up Climate Policy No Less Than Administrative Law: A Comment on Professors 
Watts and Wildermuth, 102 Nw. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2008) (manuscript at 8-13, available 
at http://www .law .northwestern.edullawreview/Colloquy/2007/20ILRColl2007n20Adler. pdt). 
291. See supra notes 279-90 and accompanying text. 
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without invoking the relaxed standards in footnote seven of 
Lujan.292 The Supreme Court in Massachusetts suggested that the 
plaintiffs had met normal standing requirements, but also invoked 
the relaxed analysis of footnote seven.293 If the majority was 
confident that the plaintiffs had met the normal three-part standing 
test, the Court could have clearly stated so and then it would not 
have needed to invoke the footnote seven standing doctrine in a case 
that did not squarely fit within a procedural rights framework. 
As is addressed in Part V, this Article's proposed standing test 
would eliminate any dispute about whether a case is procedural, 
because states filing parens patriae actions would be entitled to the 
same relaxed immediacy and redress ability requirements as 
procedural rights plaintiffs even if the state's case is substantive in 
nature.294 The proposed test would address the Court's failure to 
define how states are treated differently from other plaintiffs in 
determining standing. 
3. Did Massachusetts Meet the Traditional Three-part Standing 
Test? 
Even if one accepts Professor Adler's argument that the Court 
should not have applied footnote seven procedural rights standing 
in the case, the majority arguably could have followed Judge Tatel's 
analysis and concluded that Massachusetts met standing require-
ments.lfthe Court's three-part standing test is applied liberally, on 
the whole, the Court's opinion is persuasive that Massachusetts' 
allegations about the loss of its coastline from rising sea levels 
caused by global warming, which, in turn, are caused by growing 
concentrations of GHGs, is sufficient to meet standing require-
ments. The Court correctly rejected the EPA's argument "that 
because greenhouse gas emissions inflict widespread harm, the 
doctrine of standing presents an insuperable jurisdictional 
292. Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d 50, 64 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (Tatel, J., dissenting), rev'd, 
127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007). 
293. See Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1453 (characterizing the case as involving procedural 
rights); id. at 1455-58 (stating that plaintiffs had met the three-part standing test); Cannon, 
supra note 149, at 57 (arguing that Justice Stevens' majority opinion in Massachusetts 
satisfied all three elements of the standing test because the Court was willing to consider 
systemic injury as a legitimate basis for standing); see also supra Part III.A.3. 
294. See infra Part V. 
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obstacle.,,295 Chief Justice Roberts did not challenge the majority's 
favorable discussion of the SCRAP Court's conclusion that standing 
is not to be denied simply because many people are injured.296 
Regarding the injury portion of the standing test, the Court found 
that Massachusetts had established that global warming caused a 
ten to twenty centimeter increase in global sea levels over the 
course of the twentieth century and that those increases have 
probably already caused harm to its coastline.297 The current 
injuries to Massachusetts' coastline are concrete and immediate, 
and it is probable that growing levels of GHGs during the twenty-
first century will cause even greater harms to its coastline in the 
future. 29B Although Chief Justice Roberts is correct that computer 
models projecting the relationship between GHG levels and sea 
levels are far from precise, the majority opinion makes the stronger 
argument that Massachusetts showed injury in fact even if the exact 
magnitude of any future injuries was uncertain. 299 
Concerning the causation part of the standing test, the Court and 
Chief Justice Roberts disagreed about to what extent the petitioners 
had to establish that GHGs from new domestic motor vehicles were 
a significant factor in causing Massachusetts to lose coastal land. 
Because the U.S. transportation sector represents 6 percent of 
worldwide carbon dioxide emissions, the Court determined that 
''U.S. motor-vehicle emissions make a meaningful contribution to 
greenhouse gas concentrations and hence, according to petitioners, 
to global warming."30o By contrast, Chief Justice Roberts argued 
that the petitioners failed to establish that the EPA's regulation of 
GHGs from new domestic motor vehicles would prevent the loss of 
Massachusetts' coastal land when regulation of new vehicles 
would reduce only a fraction of the 4 percent of GHGs produced 
by the U.S. transportation sector.301 He argued that such emis-
sions play only a ''bit-part'' in the impact of the "150-year global 
295. Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1453. 
296. See id. at 1458 n.24 (citing United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency 
Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669, 687·88 (1973»; id. at 1471 n.2 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
297. See id. at 1456 (majority opinion). 
298. See id. 
299. Compare id. at 1456 n.21 (majority opinion), with id. at 1467·68 (Roberts, C.J., 
dissenting). 
300. Id. at 1457·58 (majority opinion). 
301. Id. at 1468·69 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
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phenomenon" of global warming and, therefore, it was speculative 
that the lack of EPA regulation had an impact on the alleged injury 
of Massachusetts losing coastal land. 302 
The "fairly traceable" standard for causation does not provide 
an exact test for what percentage of harm an alleged cause 
must contribute to a plaintiffs alleged injuries.303 If a defendant's 
activities have only a trivial impact on a plaintiff, then a court 
should deny standing. Deciding whether the U.S. transportation 
sector is a meaningful factor in increasing global warming depends 
on whether one emphasizes the more than 1. 7 billion metric tons of 
carbon dioxide it released in 1999 alone, which the Court cited as 
evidence of its enormous impact, or whether one emphasizes, as in 
Chief Justice Roberts' dissenting opinion, the small percentage that 
figure represents of worldwide emissions.304 Although Chief Justice 
Roberts is correct that the EPA's regulation would apply only to 
new vehicles, over time an increasing percentage of all domestic 
vehicles would be subject to regulation as old vehicles are 
eventually replaced by new ones. Because the U.S. transportation 
sector contributes 4 percent of worldwide GHGs, the Court properly 
decided that the regulation of these emissions was more than a 
trivial factor in affecting global warming and therefore was a 
sufficiently meaningful factor to warrant standing under the fairly 
traceable standard. 
The EPA argued that the plaintiffs could not meet the 
redressability portion of the standing test because federal courts 
could not control the rapidly growing emissions of developing 
nations, including China and India.305 According to the EPA, a 
favorable court decision for the plaintiffs ordering the agency to 
control domestic new vehicle emissions might be fruitless if foreign 
emissions grew more rapidly than domestic reductions.306 The Court 
was correct to reject the EPA's argument because a remedy that 
reduced the harm to the petitioners by limiting domestic emissions 
was enough to warrant standing even if the remedy could not 
302. Id. at 1469. 
303. See id. at 1464; Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992). 
304. Compare Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1457-58 (majority opinion), with id. at 1468-69 
(Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
305. See id. at 1457-58 (majority opinion). 
306. See id. 
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prevent greater harms from GHGs emitted by foreign countries.307 
Although Chief Justice Roberts is correct that the petitioners must 
establish that it is ''likely'' that the proposed relief will remedy their 
alleged injuries, he demands too much in essentially demanding 
that the petitioners quantify, at least to some extent, how the EPA's 
regulation of GHGs will reduce erosion of its coastline despite an 
increase in GHGs from other nations.30B The majority is correct that 
regulating GHGs is likely to reduce the impacts ofGHGs from what 
they would have been with no regulation. As discussed in the 
preceding paragraph, the U.S. transportation sector's 4 percent 
contribution to worldwide GHGs is more than a trivial factor in 
affecting global warming. Chief Justice Roberts demands a certainty 
in predicting the impact of the remedy that is not required. 
There is a more than plausible argument that Massachusetts 
met the normal three-part standing test, as Judge Tatel concluded 
and the majority of the Supreme Court suggested.309 Nevertheless, 
one must acknowledge that without the relaxed immediacy and 
redress ability standards of footnote seven or the special solicitude 
that the majority gave to states, the issue of whether Massachusetts 
met normal standing requirements is debatable. Chief Justice 
Roberts and Judge Sentelle present a plausible case that 
Massachusetts failed to meet the normal standing test. 310 
Accordingly, it is not surprising that the majority sought to 
characterize the case as both a footnote seven case and a special 
state standing case so that more lenient standing requirements 
would apply. 
The main difficulty with the Court's standing analysis is that it 
is never clear to what extent the majority applied reduced standing 
requirements under footnote seven or a special solicitude for states 
standard. It is possible that some members ofthe majority believed, 
like Judge Tatel, that Massachusetts had met normal standing 
requirements and that other members of the majority did not. As 
a result, the Court suggested simultaneously that Massachusetts 
307. See id. at 1458. 
308. See id. at 1469-70 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
309. Id. at 1455-58 (majority opinion) (explaining that plaintiffs had met the three-part 
standing test); Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d 50, 64 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (Tatel, J., dissenting), 
rev'd, 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007); Cannon, supra note 149, at 57; see supra Parts II.C, IILA.3. 
310. See supra Parts II.C, III.B. 
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made a strong showing under normal standing requirements and 
that the Court was applying relaxed footnote seven and special state 
solicitude standards as well.3ll The decision provides little or no 
guidance to lower courts when they face a case in which it is unclear 
whether a state has met normal standing requirements. It remains 
to be seen whether the Court in the future will limit Massachusetts 
to its facts, or perhaps to cases involving the CAA only, or if it will 
apply a rule of special solicitude for state standing in many cases.312 
IV. DOES THE PARENS PATRIAE STANDING DOCTRINE SUPPORT 
BROADER STANDING RIGHTS FOR STATES? 
In Massachusetts, the majority relied heavily upon the right of 
states to litigate as parens patriae to protect quasi-sovereign 
interests, set out in Tennessee Copper, to justify greater standing 
rights for states under the modern three-part constitutional 
standing test.313 Chief Justice Roberts, however, argued that states 
seeking to litigate as parens patriae have to meet additional 
standing requirements and not lower standing requirements.314 In 
light of this disagreement, it will be helpful to carefully examine the 
history and development of the parens patriae doctrine. Although 
Chief Justice Roberts is correct that courts have sometimes limited 
the doctrine, the broad principles underlying the right of states to 
protect quasi-sovereign interests support the Court's giving greater 
standing rights to states. 
A. The Historical Development of Parens Patriae 
In its 1982 Snapp decision, the Supreme Court reviewed the 
history and development of the parens patriae doctrine.315 In the 
311. See Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1453 (majority opinion) (characterizing the case as 
involving procedural rights); id. at 1454·55 (concluding that states in some circumstances are 
entitled to special consideration when courts make standing decisions); id. at 1455-58 
(arguing that plaintiffs had met three-part standing test); Cannon, supra note 149, at 57. 
312. See Stevenson, supra note 3, at 8 (discussing the possibility that the Supreme Court 
in the future could limit Massachusetts to cases involving the Clean Air Act). 
313. See Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1454-55 (majority opinion); supra Part III.A.2. 
314. [d. at 1465 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); supra Part III.B.2. 
315. See Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rei. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 600-08 
(1982). 
HeinOnline -- 49 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1757 2007-2008
2008] NEW STANDING TEST FOR STATES 1757 
English common law, the king had the "royal prerogative" as parent 
or father of the country, parens patriae, to act as guardian for those 
who lacked the legal capacity to act for themselves, including 
minors and the mentally disabled. 316 Mter America became in-
dependent of England and its king, American courts recognized that 
state legislatures or Congress had the prerogative to act as parens 
patriae for individuals unable to care for themselves.317 
B. Parens Patriae and Quasi-sovereign Interests 
Beginning in the early 1900s, the doctrine of parens patriae 
evolved from the common law approach of protecting individuals 
who lacked legal capacity to the quite different principle that a state 
has standing to defend its quasi-sovereign interest in the "well-
being of its populace.,,318 It is easiest to begin with what is not a 
quasi-sovereign interest. The Snapp Court explained that "[q]uasi-
sovereign interests ... are not sovereign interests, proprietary 
interests, or private interests pursued by the State as a nominal 
party.,,319 A state has a sovereign interest in the enforcement of its 
laws or the recognition of its borders.32o A state has a proprietary 
interest in the land or businesses it owns, much like "other similarly 
situated proprietors."321 A state that is "only a nominal party 
without a real interest of its own" does "not have standing under the 
parens patriae doctrine.,,322 None of these three types of interests can 
be a quasi-sovereign interest. 
Next, the Snapp Court tried to provide a definition of a quasi-
sovereign interest. The Court stated, "[Quasi-sovereign interests] 
consist of a set of interests that the State has in the well-being of its 
populace."323 The Court declared that standing principles limit the 
316. [d. at 600; see also Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 257 (1972); Estados 
Unidos Mexicanos v. DeCoster, 229 F.3d 332, 335 nA (1st Cir. 2000). 
317. E.g., Snapp, 458 U.S. at 600; Mormon Church v. United States, 136 U.S. 1,57 (1890); 
Fontain v. Ravenel, 58 U.S (17 How.) 369, 384 (1854); Estados Unidos Mexicanos, 229 F.3d 
at 335 nA; Comment, supra note 203, at 1072. 
318. Snapp, 458 U.S. at 602; see also Watts & Wildermuth, supra note 4 (manuscript at 4). 
319. Snapp, 458 U.S. at 602; see also Watts & Wildermuth, supra note 4 (manuscript at 3). 
320. Snapp, 458 U.S. at 601. 
321. [d. at 601·02; see also Watts & Wildermuth, supra note 4 (manuscript at 3). 
322. Snapp, 458 U.S. at 600. 
323. [d. at 602. 
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scope of which quasi-sovereign interests are actionable in federal 
courts. The Court stated, "Formulated so broadly, the concept risks 
being too vague to survive the standing requirements of Art. III: A 
quasi-sovereign interest must be sufficiently concrete to create an 
actual controversy between the State and the defendant."324 The 
Court acknowledged that this limitation was far from clear, stating, 
''The vagueness of this concept can only be filled in by turning to 
individual cases.,,325 
Quasi-sovereign interests include two different categories. 
According to the Snapp Court, "First, a State has a quasi-sovereign 
interest in the health and well-being-both physical and economic 
--of its residents in general.,,326 As to the first category, the Court 
has never established any specific requirements as to "the pro-
portion of the population of the State that must be adversely 
affected by the challenged behavior."327 The Court explained, 
"Although more must be alleged than injury to an identifiable group 
of individual residents, the indirect effects of the injury must be 
considered as well in determining whether the State has alleged 
injury to a sufficiently substantial segment of its population.,,328 
Furthermore, 
One helpful indication in determining whether an alleged injury 
to the health and welfare of its citizens suffices to give the State 
standing to sue as parens patriae is whether the injury is one 
that the State, if it could, would likely attempt to address 
through its sovereign lawmaking powers329 
rather than through "private bills" designed to assist "particular 
individuals."330 Massachusetts' interest in protecting its coastline 
affects the welfare of a large number of its citizens and, therefore, 
is an appropriate quasi-sovereign interest. 
According to the Snapp Court, the second type of parens patriae 
suit involves a state's "quasi-sovereign interest in not being 
324. [d. 
325. [d. 
326. [d. at 607. 
327. [d. 
328. [d. 
329. [d. 
330. [d. at 607 n.14. 
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discriminatorily denied its rightful status within the federal 
system.,,331 The Court explained, ''Distinct from but related to the 
general well-being of its residents, the State has an interest in 
securing observance of the terms under which it participates in the 
federal system."332 For example, a state can sue another state that 
imposes barriers to trade in violation of the Commerce Clause.333 A 
state can sue another state or private firm for violating a federal 
statute that provides benefits to the state's citizens as long as the 
state is "more than a nominal party.,,334 The Snapp Court concluded 
that "a State does have an interest, independent of the benefits 
that might accrue to any particular individual, in assuring that 
the benefits of the federal system are not denied to its general 
population.,,335 As discussed below, the second type of parens patriae 
is arguably justification for parens patriae suits by states against 
the federal government if the executive branch is failing to enforce 
a federal law, although the Snapp decision did not allow such 
suits.336 
C. Parens Patriae and Suits To Enjoin Public Nuisances 
The earliest successful parens patriae cases involved suits to 
enjoin public nuisances.337 Public nuisance cases are the most 
analogous parens patriae cases compared to the global warming suit 
in Massachusetts. 338 In its 1901 decision, Missouri u. fllinois, the 
331. Id. at 607. 
332. Id. at 607-08. 
333. Id. at 608 (citing Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553 (1923». 
334. Id. (citing Georgia v. Pa. R.R. Co., 324 U.S. 439 (1945) (federal antitrust laws); 
Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725 (1981) (Natural Gas Act». 
335. Id. 
336. See infra Part IV.H. 
337. See Snapp, 458 U.S. at 603-05 (listing and discussing parens patriae cases involving 
suits to enjoin public nuisances); see also North Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U.S. 365 (1923) 
(flooding); Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419 (1922) (diversion of water); New York v. New 
Jersey, 256 U.S. 296 (1921) (water pollution); Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 
(1907) (air pollution); Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907) (diversion of water); Kansas v. 
Colorado, 185 U.S. 125 (1902) (diversion of water); Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208 (1901) 
(water pollution). 
338. See David A. Grossman, Warming Up to a Not-Sa-Radical Idea: Tort-Based Climate 
Change Litigation, 28 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 3-5 (2003); Mank, supra note 266, at 197-98; 
Merrill, supra note 5, at 328-33. But see Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power, 406 F. Supp. 2d 265, 
268,274 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (dismissing a public nuisance suit by eight state attorneys general 
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Court considered Missouri's request for an injunction to enjoin 
Illinois from discharging sewage that polluted the Mississippi River 
in Missouri.339 The Missouri Court declared that a state could sue to 
protect the health of its citizens: 
It is true that no question of boundary is involved, nor of direct 
property rights belonging to the complainant State. But it must 
surely be conceded that, if the health and comfort of the 
inhabitants of a State are threatened, the State is the proper 
party to represent and defend them. 340 
The Missouri Court "relied upon an analogy to independent 
countries in order to delineate those interests that a State could 
pursue in federal court as parens patriae, apart from its sovereign 
and proprietary interests.,,341 The Court stated: 
If Missouri were an independent and sovereign State all must 
admit that she could seek a remedy by negotiation, and, that 
failing, by force. Diplomatic powers and the right to make war 
having been surrendered to the general government, it was to be 
expected that upon the latter would be devolved the duty of 
providing a remedy and that remedy, we think, is found in the 
constitutional provisions we are considering.342 
The Tennessee Copper Court followed Missouri's approach of 
justifying state parens patriae suits for quasi-sovereign interests 
as a substitute for the sovereign interests that states surrender 
when they join the United States.343 Additionally, Tennessee Copper 
expanded the scope of quasi-sovereign interests protected by parens 
patriae suits from protecting the health of their citizens from public 
against five large public utilities as violating the political question doctrine). 
339. 180 U.S. 208 (1901). In a subsequent case, the Court denied Missouri's request for an 
injunction without prejudice because it was unclear whether the typhoid bacillus in the 
sewage survived the journey from Illinois to Missouri and there was evidence of other possible 
infection in other sewage sources, including towns in Missouri, but the Court left it open to 
Missouri to submit additional evidence addressing whether Illinois was the source of the 
alleged disease. Missouri v. Illinois (Missouri II), 200 U.S. 496, 521-26 (1906). 
340. Missouri, 180 U.S. at 241. 
341. Snapp, 458 U.S. at 603. 
342. Missouri, 180 U.S. at 241. 
343. Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907). 
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nuisances to safeguarding their land, air, and natural resources. 344 
The Tennessee Copper Court stated: 
This is a suit by a State for an injury to it in its capacity of 
quasi-sovereign. In that capacity the State has an interest 
independent of and behind the titles of its citizens, in all the 
earth and air within its domain. It has the last word as to 
whether its mountains shall be stripped of their forests and its 
inhabitants shall breathe pure air .... When the States by their 
union made the forcible abatement of outside nuisances 
impossible to each, they did not thereby agree to submit to 
whatever might be done. They did not renounce the possibility 
of making reasonable demands on the ground of their still 
remaining quasi-sovereign interests; and the alternative to force 
is a suit in this court.346 
Thus, even though Georgia owned very little of the affected land, 
it still had a quasi-sovereign interest in protecting the land and 
natural resources within its borders, as well as the health of its 
citizens.346 The Court stated that the evidence of harm to the state's 
natural resources alone was sufficient to require injunctive relief to 
protect the state's quasi-sovereign interests: "[W]e are satisfied by 
a preponderance of evidence that the sulphurous fumes cause and 
threaten damage on so considerable a scale to the forests and 
vegetable life, if not to health, within the plaintiff State as to 
make out a case within the requirements of Missouri."347 Because 
Tennessee Copper recognized that a state has a quasi-sovereign 
344. See id.; Ricard Ieyoub & Theodore Eisenberg, State Attorney General Actions, the 
Tobacco Litigation, and the Doctrine of Parens Patriae, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1859, 1867 (2000) ("In 
Georgia ex rei. Hart v. Tennessee Copper Co., a state's quasi-sovereign interest was extended 
beyond the general concepts of the health and comfort of its citizens to specifically include 
interests in the land on which they reside and in the air that they breathe."); Allan Kanner, 
The Public Trust Doctrine, Parens Patriae, and the Attorney General as the Guardian of the 
State's Natural Resources, 16 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'y F. 57, 107 (2005) ("The Supreme Court, 
observing that the state owned very little of the property alleged to be damaged, recast the 
state's claim as a suit for injury to resources owned by Georgia in its capacity of 'quasi-
sovereign."'). 
345. Tenn. Copper, 206 U.S. at 237 (citing Missouri, 180 U.S. at 241). 
346. See id. at 238-39; Kanner, supra note 344. 
347. Tenn. Copper, 206 U.S. at 238-39; Bee alBa Kanner, Bupra note 344. 
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interest in protecting its natural resources, Massachusetts has a 
similar quasi-sovereign interest in protecting its coastline.348 
Chief Justice Roberts is technically correct that the Tennessee 
Copper decision only gave states greater remedies than private 
individuals and did not address the issue of standing. 349 The absence 
of standing language in Tennessee Copper is not surprising because 
the Court did not create a standing doctrine until 1944.350 The 
Tennessee Copper Court's underlying reasoning, however, was based 
on the broader principle that states are entitled to broader rights 
than individuals because of the quasi-sovereign rights they retain 
as a limited substitute for their former full sovereign rights.351 
These broader principles are consistent with the Massachusetts 
Court's decision to grant states broader standing rights than 
individuals.352 
D. Parens Patriae Actions Other than Public Nuisances 
Although the first parens patriae cases involved public nuisances, 
the Snapp Court observed that ''parens patriae interests extend 
well beyond the prevention of such traditional public nuisances."353 
The Court in Pennsylvania v. West Virginia in 1923 allowed 
Pennsylvania to represent the quasi-sovereign interests of its 
residents in maintaining access to natural gas produced in West 
Virginia.354 The Pennsylvania Court stated: 
348. See Maine v. MNTamano, 357 F. Supp.1097, 1100 (D. Me. 1973) (holding that a state 
has a quasi·sovereign interest in coastal resources); Maryland v. Amerada Hess Corp., 350 
F. Supp. 1060, 1065-67 (D. Md. 1972) (allowing a state to me a parens patriae suit to recover 
damages to coastal waters from an oil spill); State v. Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co., 336 A.2d 
750, 758 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1975) (allowing a state to me a parens patriae suit to 
recover damages for fish kill), reu'd on other grounds, 351 A.2d 337 (N.J. 1976); Ieyoub & 
Eisenberg, supra note 344, at 1869-70 & n.56 (discussing the state quasi-sovereign interest 
in natural resources, including coastal resources); Kanner, supra note 344, at 107-09 
(discussing the state quasi-sovereign interest in natural resources). 
349. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1465 (2007) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); 
supra notes 183-85 and accompanying text. 
350. See Stark v. Wickard, 321 U.S. 288, 310 (1944) (becoming the first Supreme Court case 
to explicitly state the Article III standing requirements); supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
351. See Tenn. Copper, 206 U.S. at 237. 
352. See Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1454-55 (majority opinion); infra Part IV.G. 
353. Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 605 (1982). 
354. 262 U.S. 553, 581, 591 (1923). 
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The private consumers in each State ... constitute a substantial 
portion of the State's population. Their health, comfort and 
welfare are seriously jeopardized by the threatened withdrawal 
of the gas from the interstate stream. This is a matter of grave 
public concern in which the State, as representative of the 
public, has an interest apart from that of the individuals 
affected. It is not merely a remote or ethical interest but one 
which is immediate and recognized by law.355 
1763 
In its 1945 decision, Georgia v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., the 
Court held that Georgia could bring a parens patriae suit to protect 
state residents from alleged antitrust violations because the 
economic harms at issue were as important as the issues in public 
nuisance cases like Tennessee Copper or Missouri. 356 The Court 
stated: 
If the allegations of the bill are taken as true, the economy of 
Georgia and the welfare of her citizens have seriously suffered 
as the result of this alleged conspiracy .... [Trade barriers] may 
cause a blight no less serious than the spread of noxious gas over 
the land or the deposit of sewage in the streams .... These are 
matters of grave public concern in which Georgia has an interest 
apart from that of particular individuals who may be affected. 357 
In the economic injury parens patriae cases, the state's suit was not 
based on its own injuries, but instead as the representative of its 
citizens for their injuries.358 
355. [d. at 592. 
356. 324 U.S. 439, 443-44, 450-51 (1945). 
357. [d. at 450-51. 
358. States can sue if they suffer individual injuries, but parens patriae actions are based 
solely on states acting in a representative capacity for their citizens' interests. See Maryland 
v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 737-39 (1981) (authorizing parens patriae suit for states to 
challenge "first use" tax imposed by Louisiana on certain uses of natural gas where "a great 
many citizens in each of the plaintiff States are themselves consumers of natural gas and are 
faced with increased costs aggregating millions of dollars per year"). A state can sue both in 
its individual capacity and as parens patriae, but the Supreme Court has treated such suits 
as analytically separate. See id. 
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E. Justice Brennan's Broader Concurring Opinion in Snapp 
In his concurring opinion in Snapp, Justice Brennan, joined by 
Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens, stated: "At the very 
least, the prerogative of a State to bring suits in federal court should 
be commensurate with the ability of private organizations."359 He 
then implied that states should have greater rights than 
individuals: 
More significantly, a State is no ordinary litigant. As a sovereign 
entity, a State is entitled to assess its needs, and decide which 
concerns of its citizens warrant its protection and intervention. 
I know of nothing -except the Constitution or overriding federal 
law-that might lead a federal court to superimpose its 
judgment for that of a State with respect to the substantiality or 
legitimacy of a State's assertion of sovereign interest.3GO 
Although he does not explicitly declare that states have greater 
standing rights than individuals, his argument that federal 
courts should normally defer to a state's "assertion of sovereign 
interests" would effectively give states greater standing rights than 
individuals, although not automatic standing. Presumably, Justice 
Brennan meant to include quasi-sovereign interests along with 
sovereign interests because the Snapp decision was primarily 
concerned with quasi-sovereign interests and not purely sovereign 
interests. 
F. Standing in Public Nuisance Cases 
The traditional rule in public nuisance cases is that the state has 
automatic standing as a sovereign.361 Courts viewed public nuisance 
359. Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rei. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 611 (1982) 
(Brennan, J., concurring). Four justices did not join his concurrence: Chief Justice Burger and 
Justices White, who wrote the majority opinion, Rehnquist, and O'Connor. [d. at 594 (majority 
opinion). Justice Powell did not participate in the case. [d. at 610. 
360. [d. at 612 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
361. See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Festival Theatre Corp., 438 N.E.2d 159, 162 (Ill. 1982) 
("Equitable jurisdiction to abate public nuisances is said to be of 'ancient origin,' and it exists 
even where not conferred by statute .... "); see also Grossman, supra note 338, at 55; David 
Kairys, The Governmental Handgun Cases and the Elements and Underlying Policies of Public 
Nuisance Law, 32 CONN. L. REV. 1175, 1177 n.9 (2000); Matthew F. Pawa & Benjamin A. 
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cases as quasi-criminal in nature, and states have always had 
automatic standing in criminal cases.362 Thus, a court might 
presume that a state in a public nuisance case has standing. 
Perhaps that presumption explains why early Supreme Court cases 
like Missouri and Tennessee Copper do not question the right of 
states to bring suit. 
Professor Merrill argues that the issue of whether states deserve 
automatic standing in public nuisance cases is more complicated 
when a state brings an action in the courts of another sovereign, the 
federal courts.363 As a matter of theory, based on the principle that 
states can only bring criminal actions in their own courts, he would 
prefer that states should only bring public nuisance actions in their 
own courts because they are quasi-criminal in nature,364 but he 
concedes that "it is almost certainly too late in the day to advance 
any general rule that public nuisance actions, like criminal actions, 
must always be brought in the courts of the sovereign that institutes 
the action.,,365 As an alternative, he proposes a rule whereby states 
would have automatic standing when they bring parens patriae 
suits in their own courts, but would apply "the same Article III and 
prudential standing limitations that apply to suits by aggrieved 
Krass, Behind the Curve: The National Media's Reporting on Global Warming, 33 B. C. ENVTL. 
AFF. L. REV. 485, 489-90 (2006). However, Professors Woolhandler and Collins argue that 
during the nineteenth century, federal courts would not have granted automatic standing to 
states filing nuisance suits in a federal court, but would have required the state to 
demonstrate "'particularized' or special injury," the same as any private individual. Ann 
Woolhandler & Michael G. Collins, State Standing, 81 VA. L. REV. 387, 432-33 (1995) 
(discussing Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 54 U.S. (13 How.) 518, 559 
(1851». They acknowledge that federal courts by the early 1900s did grant automatic standing 
to states filing suit in federal courts under a parens patriae theory. [d. at 446-47 (citing 
Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208, 241, 244 (1901». 
362. See Grossman, supra note 338, at 55; Pawa & Krass, supra note 361, at 489-90; 
Merrill, supra note 5, at 300-01, 304. 
363. Merrill, supra note 5, at 302-04; Watts & Wildermuth, supra note 4 (manuscript at 4-
5) (discussing Professor Merrill's proposal that states should not have automatic standing 
when they file public nuisance suits in federal courts). 
364. See Merrill, supra note 5, at 301-03. 
365. [d. at 303. 
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citizens" to states when they bring such actions in federal courts.3GG 
Yet he acknowledges: 
There is no suggestion from the Supreme Court's original 
jurisdiction cases adjudicating transboundary nuisance disputes 
-the paradigm for the modern parens patriae action-that the 
States bringing these suits were required to meet any particular 
standing burden in order to maintain the action. One could 
attempt to distinguish these cases on the grounds that today's 
elaborate standing doctrine, requiring injury in fact, causation, 
redressability and so forth, is a relatively recent development 
that postdates the decisions in these transboundary cases. 
Moreover, it is quite likely that if in fact one were to apply 
modern standing requirements to these transboundary suits, the 
States would have been able to establish standing in each of 
these cases. Still, the absence of any discussion in these cases 
that even sounds like the Court was considering a standing 
requirement makes it substantially more difficult to maintain 
that traditional standing notions should be turned on or off 
depending on whether public officers are suing in the courts of 
their own sovereign. 367 
Although he personally disagrees with automatic standing in 
parens patriae cases, Professor Merrill concedes that the Missouri 
and Tennessee Copper decisions appear to have granted states 
standing by right in parens patriae actions.3GB His analysis strongly 
suggests that the Massachusetts Court was closer to the spirit of 
those two decisions than Chief Justice Roberts' dissenting opinion. 
366. [d. at 304-05; Watts & Wildermuth, supra note 4 (manuscript at 4-5) (agreeing with 
Merrill that states should not have automatic standing when they me public nuisance suits 
in federal courts). Federal courts followed Merrill's approach of not giving states automatic 
standing in nuisance suits in the federal courts during the nineteenth century; but by the 
early 1900s they were granting states automatic standing under the parens patriae doctrine. 
See Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 361, at 432-33 (citing Wheeling & Belmont Bridge, 54 
U.S. (13 How.) at 561; id. at 446-47 (citing Missouri, 180 U.S. at 240-41, 244). 
367. Merrill, supra note 5, at 305-06 (footnotes omitted). 
368. See id. at 302-06. 
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G. States Are Entitled to Greater Standing Rights in Parens 
Patriae Cases Involving Quasi-sovereign Interests 
1767 
Because the parens patriae doctrine gives states the right to 
protect a broad range of interests that affect the health, safety, 
welfare, and economics of their citizens, it is reasonable to give 
states broader latitude in obtaining standing for generalized 
injuries that affect many of their citizens. Courts have recognized 
parens patriae standing for mass torts and consumer fraud. 369 
Indeed, courts may properly deny parens patriae standing if a suit 
involves only a few injured individuals because those individuals 
could bring their own lawsuit and thus the state is only a nominal 
party.370 States are the ideal party to bring a suit challenging global 
warming because such generalized harms affect the welfare of many 
of their citizens and the state is in a better position to represent 
their common interests than any group of individuals. Professor 
Merrill argues "that the State's interest in protecting the health and 
wellbeing of its citizens from transboundary nuisances is the 
paradigm case of a quasi -sovereign interest that will support parens 
patriae standing."371 
Following Justice Holmes' broad reasoning in Tennessee Copper, 
the Massachusetts Court made a strong argument that states are 
entitled to greater latitude concerning standing to protect their 
quasi -sovereign interests. 372 The Supreme Court has long recognized 
that states have a quasi-sovereign interest in protecting their water 
resources.373 Lower court decisions have specifically concluded that 
369. See Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 737-39 (1981) (authorizing parens patriae 
suit for states to challenge "First Use Tax" imposed by Louisiana on certain uses of natural 
gas where "a great many citizens in each of the plaintiff States are themselves consumers of 
natural gas and are faced with increased costs aggregating millions of dollars per year"); 
Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 238-39 (1907) (allowing Georgia to bring public 
nuisance suit on behalf of numerous citizens affected by air pollution); Ieyoub & Eisenberg, 
supra note 344, at 1870; Kenneth Juan Figueroa, Note, Immigrants and the Civil Rights 
Regime: Parens Patriae Standing, Foreign Governments and Protection from Private 
Discrimination, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 408, 436 n.146 (2002). 
370. See supra notes 319-22, 334 and accompanying text. 
371. Merrill, supra note 5, at 304. 
372. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1454-55 (2007) (majority opinion). 
373. See, e.g., North Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U.S. 365 (1923) (flooding); Wyoming v. 
Colorado, 259 U.S. 419 (1922) (diversion of water); New York v. New Jersey, 256 U.S. 296 
(1921) (water pollution); Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907) (diversion of water); Kansas 
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states have a quasi-sovereign interest in their coastal waters and 
the biological and natural resources associated with them. 374 
Massachusetts has a quasi-sovereign interest in protecting its 
coastline from global warming and should have standing to protect 
it in the federal courts. 
Although neither the Missouri nor Tennessee Copper decisions 
directly involved standing, the Court in those parens patriae 
decisions implicitly gave states broader standing rights by allowing 
a state to obtain broad remedies for a public nuisance without 
requiring them to prove the specific injuries required in suits by 
individual litigants, who must prove direct and particularized harm 
to themselves. In Tennessee Copper, Justice Holmes acknowledged 
that the Court granted equitable reliefto Georgia that it might well 
not have given to private litigants. He stated: 
If any such demand [for equitable relief] is to be enforced this 
must be, notwithstanding the hesitation that we mightfeel if the 
suit were between private parties, and the doubt whether for the 
injuries which they might be suffering to their property they 
should not be left to an action at law.375 
According to the First Circuit, the parens patriae doctrine "creates 
an exception to the normal rules of standing applied to private 
citizens in recognition of the special role that a State plays in 
pursuing its quasi-sovereign interests in the 'well-being of its 
populace.",376 
v. Colorado, 185 U.S. 125 (1902) (diversion of water); Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208 (1901) 
(water pollution). 
374. See supra note 348. 
375. Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 238 (1907). 
376. Estados Unidos Mexicanos v. DeCoster, 229 F.3d 332, 335 (1st Cir. 2000) (quoting 
Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex reI. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 602 (1982». The First 
Circuit qualified this statement by stating that "[ilt is a judicially created exception that has 
been narrowly construed." Id. 
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H. Can States File Parens Patriae Suits Against the Federal 
Government? 
1769 
Following Massachusetts v. Mellon,377 Chief Justice Roberts 
argued that a· state may not assert a quasi-sovereign interest 
against the federal government.37S The Mellon decision held that 
states may not sue the federal government in a parens patriae 
capacity because the federal government is in the position of parens 
patriae, for those same citizens are both federal and state citizens.379 
[T]he citizens of Massachusetts are also citizens of the United 
States. It cannot be conceded that a State, as parens patriae, 
may institute judicial proceedings to protect citizens of the 
United States from the operation of the statutes thereof. While 
the State, under some circumstances, may sue in that capacity 
for the protection of its citizens, it is no part of its duty or power 
to enforce their rights in respect of their relations with the 
Federal Government. In that field it is the United States, and 
not the State, which represents them as parens patriae, when 
such representation becomes appropriate; and to the former, and 
not to the latter, they must look for such protective measures as 
flow from that status.3BO 
A footnote in the 1982 Alfred L. Snapp & Son decision expressed 
agreement with the Mellon decision that states cannot file parens 
patriae suits against the federal government.3S1 Professors Watts 
and Wildermuth also agree with Mellon's reasoning and argue that 
[b]ecause a state's quasi-sovereign interests are based on 
protecting "the well-being of its populace," it seems to follow that 
a state would not be permitted to bring suit as parens patriae 
against the federal government because the federal government 
is not only charged with the same obligation to protect those 
377. 262 U.S. 447 (1923). 
378. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1466 (2007) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) 
(citing Mellon, 262 U.S. at 485-86). 
379. See Mellon, 262 U.S. at 485-86. 
380. Id. (internal citation omitted). 
381. Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex reI. Barez, 458 U.S. 592,610 n.16 (1982) 
("A State does not have standing as parens patriae to bring an action against the Federal 
Government." (citing Mellon, 262 U.S. at 485-86 (1923))). 
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residents, but it typically stands in a superior position to that of 
the states to do SO.382 
The majority opinion distinguished Mellon by limiting it to its 
facts involving a suit to prevent the application of federal tax laws 
in Massachusetts. Justice Stevens stated that "there is a critical 
difference between allowing a State 'to protect her citizens from the 
operation of federal statutes' (which is what Mellon prohibits) and 
allowing a State to assert its rights under federal law (which it 
has standing to do)."383 Accordingly, the Court concluded that 
Massachusetts properly asserted its quasi-sovereign interest to 
require the federal government to enforce the CAA.384 The majority 
opinion cited a 1995 parens patriae case in which the Court allowed 
a cross-claim against the United States as evidence that it did not 
prohibit parens patriae suits by states against the federal 
government in all circumstances; however, that case did not discuss 
or distinguish Mellon or Snapp.385 
Although not discussed by the Massachusetts majority, several 
lower court decisions have treated the Snapp footnote as dicta and 
allowed states to file parens patriae suits against the federal 
government to require the government to enforce rights in a federal 
statute on behalf of their citizens, which is consistent with the 
reasoning of the majority in Massachusetts. 386 While serving on 
the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, then-Judge Scalia authored an 
382. Watts & Wildermuth, supra note 4 (manuscript at 5·6). 
383. Massachusetts, 127 s. Ct. at 1455 n.17 (majority opinion). 
384. See id. 
385. See id. (citing Nebraska v. Wyoming, 515 U.S. 1,20 (1995) (holding that Wyoming had 
standing to bring a cross·claim against the United States "to vindicate its 'quasi·sovereign' 
interests which are 'independent of and behind the titles of its citizens, in all the earth and 
air within its domain"'». 
386. See, e.g., Connecticut ex reI. Blumenthal v. U.S. Dep't of Commerce, 369 F. Supp. 2d 
237, 245 n.8 (D. Conn. 2005) (treating the Snapp footnote as dicta and allowing a state to 
bring parens patriae suit against the federal government); P.R. Pub. Hous. Admin. v. U.S. 
Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 59 F. Supp. 2d 310, 326 (D.P.R. 1999); Kansas v. United States, 
748 F. Supp. 797, 802 (D. Kan. 1990) (allowing a state to bring parens patriae suit against the 
federal government); Abrams v. Heckler, 582 F. Supp. 1155, 1159·60 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (treating 
the Snapp footnote as dicta and allowing a state to bring parens patriae suit against the 
federal government); Comment, supra note 203, at 1089·93. But see State ex reI. Sullivan v. 
Lujan, 969 F.2d 877, 883 (10th Cir. 1992) (interpreting Snapp to bar all parens patriae suits 
by state against federal government); Nevada v. Burford, 918 F.2d 854, 858 (9th Cir. 1990); 
Iowa v. Block, 771 F.2d 347,354·55 (8th Cir. 1985). 
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opmIOn allowing a Maryland commission to file suit as parens 
patriae against the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission because 
he concluded that Mellon's limitation of parens patriae suits against 
the federal government was only a prudential limitation on standing 
subject to congressional override rather than a constitutional 
prohibition against standing. He determined that the statute 
implicitly authorized parens patriae suits when it authorized suits 
by states or their commissions even though it was unlikely that a 
state would have an interest in natural gas as a purchaser.387 Judge 
Scalia stated that, at least in some circumstances, Congress can 
override Mellon's limitation of parens patriae suits against the 
federal government, including "where the subject of challenge is 
Executive compliance with statutory requirements in a field where 
the federal government and the states have long shared regulatory 
responsibility; we have no doubt that congressional elimination 
of the rule of Massachusetts v. Mellon is effective."388 Because, 
following Justice Scalia's reasoning, the Clean Air Act is premised 
upon shared responsibility between states and the federal 
government,389 it was reasonable for the Massachusetts majority to 
conclude that Congress implicitly allowed states to bring parens 
patriae suits against the EPA for allegedly failing to comply with 
the Act. The dissenting justices in Massachusetts might respond 
that the Clean Air Act does not contain any language clearly 
overriding Mellon's limitation of parens patriae suits against the 
federal government, but the purpose of the Act in enhancing air 
quality for the public would be enhanced if states can file parens 
patriae suits against the executive branch for any alleged failures 
to comply with the statute. 
This Article agrees with the Massachusetts majority that states 
should be able to file parens patriae suits on behalf of its citizens 
against the federal government if the federal government has 
allegedly failed to perform a statutory or constitutional duty. In 
theory, the Mellon decision is correct that the federal government 
387. Md. People's Counsel v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 760 F.2d 318, 320·22 (D.C. 
Cir. 1985). 
388. Id. at 322. 
389. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 7407·10 (2000) (giving the U.S. EPA responsibility for 
establishing national ambient air quality standards (NAAQS) and states primary 
responsibility for implementation of NAAQS). 
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ought to act as parens patriae on behalf of each state's citizens to 
secure their rights under federal laws and that, if that is the case, 
there is no need for state suits against the federal government. The 
reality is, however, that the executive branch does not always 
appropriately enforce federal laws. The Snapp decision authorizes 
states to sue on behalf of their citizens if they are denied federal 
rights, observing that 
the State has an interest in securing observance of the terms 
under which it participates in the federal system. In the context 
of parens patriae actions, this means ensuring that the State 
and its residents are not excluded from the benefits that are to 
flow from participation in the federal system.a9o 
Although a footnote in Snapp declared that states cannot file parens 
patriae suits against the federal government,391 the broader rea-
soning of Snapp suggests that states should be able to file such suits 
if the federal government fails to protect the rights of the state's 
citizens. 392 
Professors Watts and Wildermuth observe that the Massachusetts 
Court provides a confusing explanation of why states can file parens 
patriae suits against the federal government by stating that 
Massachusetts was protecting its own rights rather than those of its 
citizens: 
Instead of explaining its result by, for example, reasoning that 
sovereigns need to be able to protect their residents from the 
federal government in the complicated modern federal 
administrative system, the Court insists that the difference in 
this case is that a state may not sue the federal government 
based on its interest in protecting its citizens but it may sue the 
federal government "when it assert[s] its [own] rights under 
federal law." That sounds like the assertion of a sovereign 
interest, i.e., where the federal legislation directly operates on 
390. Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex reI. Barez, 458 U.S. 592,607·08 (1982). 
391. Id. at 610 n.16. 
392. See id. at 607·08; Watts & Wildermuth, supra note 4 (manuscript at 7) ("[G]iven the 
Court's observation that the federal government has an obligation to protect Massachusetts 
under the CAA, the state's interest could be in protecting its residents by 'securing observance 
of the terms under which it participates in the federal system.m (footnote omitted». 
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a state and the state asserts its own legally protected interest in 
response. As we noted above, there is no bar to suing the federal 
government when a state asserts a sovereign interest. But the 
Court specifically identified Massachusetts's relevant interest as 
a quasi-sovereign interest, not a sovereign interest.393 
1773 
Professors Watts and Wildermuth convincingly argue that the 
confusion likely arises from the statement in Snapp that "[a] State 
has a quasi-sovereign interest in not being discriminatorily denied 
its rightful status within the federal system.,,394 This language is 
misleading because it is clear that the Court's cases on quasi-
sovereign interests always refer to an interest related to a state's 
residents rather than simply the state's own interest. They observe 
that all of the cases cited by Snapp involve the protection of state 
residents and not the state itself.395 Furthermore, the Snapp 
decision then accurately characterizes the quasi-sovereign interest 
as "'assuring that the benefits of the federal system are not denied 
to its general population'" rather than to the state's interests.396 
Accordingly, they conclude that "it is clear that quasi-sovereign 
interests must always relate back to a state's residents.,,397 The 
Massachusetts decision should have stated more clearly that 
Massachusetts has a right to file parens patriae suits against the 
federal government because of the interests of its residents in 
protecting its coastline from the impacts of global warming, rather 
than because of the proprietary interest of the Commonwealth in 
those portions of its coastline that it owns-which is a proprietary 
interest similar to a private owner or possibly a sovereign interest 
in its borders, but is not a quasi-sovereign interest.39s The 
Massachusetts conclusion that states ought to have greater standing 
rights to defend their quasi-sovereign interest in the health, 
welfare, and natural resources of their citizens is correct even if the 
Court's reliance in part on the Commonwealth's ownership of some 
393. Watts & Wildermuth, supra note 4 (manuscript at 8) (quoting Massachusetts v. EPA, 
127 S. Ct. 1438, 1455 n.17 (2007) (footnote omitted». 
394. [d. at 8 (quoting Snapp, 458 U.S. at 607). 
395. [d. at 9. 
396. [d. (quoting Snapp, 458 U.S. at 608). 
397. [d. at 9. 
398. See Snapp, 458 U.S. at 600-02 (defining proprietary, sovereign, and quasi-sovereign 
interests); Watts & Wildermuth, supra note 4 (manuscript at 3-7); supra Part III.C.l. 
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of the property is contrary to the rationale for allowing states 
greater rights in parens patriae suits. 
1. Limits on Parens Patriae Suits 
A weakness of the Massachusetts decision is that it does not 
provide any guidelines on the limits of special standing for states.399 
The Snapp Court broadly defined quasi-sovereign interests to 
include any issue that affects the "well-being of [a state's] populace," 
but warned that because this definition was "[fJormulated so 
broadly, the concept risks being too vague to survive the standing 
requirements of Art. III.,,400 The Akins decision provides limits on 
Article III suits by requiring a concrete injury if a plaintiff asserts 
an injury that affects the population at large.401 The Massachusetts 
decision concluded that the injuries to Massachusetts' coastline from 
global warming were sufficiently concrete to meet the Akins test.402 
In the future, courts should not give special standing to states if the 
alleged injuries are trivial, only affect a few individuals who could 
sue themselves, or are non-concrete generalized injuries that fail the 
Akins test. In all other cases, courts should give special standing to 
states. 
One issue not addressed by the Court is whether relaxed standing 
for states will result in states filing more suits within the Supreme 
Court's original jurisdiction.403 For many years, the Court has 
sought to restrict the number of cases it hears within its original 
jurisdiction to those involving two or more states and has exercised 
399. See supra Part III.C.l. 
400. Snapp, 458 U.S. at 602. 
401. See Fed. Election Comm'n v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 24·25 (1998). 
402. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1456 (2007) (majority opinion). 
403. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2 (stating Supreme Court shall have "original 
Jurisdiction" in cases "in which a State shall be a Party"); 28 U.S.C. § 1251 (2000) ("(A) The 
Supreme Court shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction of all controversies between two 
or more States. (B) The Supreme Court shall have original but not exclusive jurisdiction of: 
(1) All actions or proceedings to which ambassadors, other public ministers, consuls, or vice 
consuls of foreign states are parties; (2) All controversies between the United States and a 
State; (3) All actions or proceedings by a State against the citizens of another State or against 
aliens."); RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., DANIEL J. MELTZER & DAVID L. SHAPIRO, HART AND 
WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 292·93 & n.6 (5th ed. 2003) 
(asking whether the Supreme Court might want to restrict state standing to avoid too many 
suits within its original jurisdiction). 
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its discretion not to hear cases involving states and non-state 
parties.404 One solution would be to apply relaxed standing only 
when a state files suit in district court and to deny relaxed standing 
if a state seeks to sue within the Supreme Court's original juris-
diction.405 
v. A PROPOSED STANDING TEST: RELAXING THE IMMEDIACY AND 
REDRESSABILITY REQIDREMENTS FOR STATES 
The Massachusetts Court failed to explain when or to what extent 
courts should relax standing requirements for states. Using the 
Court's footnote seven procedural rights standing test as a model, 
this Article proposes to relax the immediacy and redressability 
requirements of the standing test when states file parens patriae 
suits to protect the health, welfare, or natural resources of their 
citizens. The Court's historic decisions in Missouri and Tennessee 
Copper support this test. 
The Missouri decision supports relaxing the immediacy require-
ment for states. In granting injunctive relief, the Missouri Court 
considered not just the actual harms from the sewage, but also the 
potential risks: 
The health and comfort of the large communities inhabiting 
those parts of the State situated on the Mississippi [R]iver are 
not alone concerned, but contagious and typhoidal diseases 
introduced in the river communities may spread themselves 
throughout the territory of the State. Moreover, substantial 
impairment of the health and prosperity of the towns and cities 
of the state situated on the Mississippi [R]iver, including its 
404. See, e.g., Ohio v. Wyandotte Chems. Corp., 401 U.S. 493, 497-99 (1971) (denying a 
state's motion for leave to file suit within the Court's original jurisdiction and stating as a 
matter of policy that the Court should exercise discretion to limit original jurisdiction suits 
because of "the diminished societal concern in our function as a court of original jurisdiction 
and the enhanced importance of our role as the final federal appellate court"); FALLON ET AL., 
supra note 403, at 280, 294-304 (discussing cases in which the Court exercised discretion to 
decline original jurisdiction in favor of another forum). 
405. See FALLON ET AL., supra note 403 (asking whether the Supreme Court should allow 
broader standing if a state chooses to file parens patriae suit in district court rather than 
within the Court's original jurisdiction). 
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commercial metropolis, would injuriously affect the entire 
state.406 
The Missouri Court's consideration of potential harms supports the 
Massachusetts Court's consideration of the future harms of global 
warming. 407 Although Chief Justice Roberts could try to argue that 
the potential harms in Missouri were more likely to occur than 
those asserted in Massachusetts, the Massachusetts petitioners 
presented far more scientific evidence in the computer models 
supporting their assertions than was possible for plaintiffs to 
present in 1901.408 
The Tennessee Copper decision supports relaxing the re-
dressability portion of the standing test for states. Chief Justice 
Roberts acknowledges that the Tennessee Copper decision gave 
states greater remedies than private individuals.409 In Tennessee 
Copper, Justice Holmes stated that Georgia could not meet the 
normal requirements for equitable relief. He stated: 
The case has been argued largely as if it were one between two 
private parties; but it is not. The very elements that would be 
relied upon in a suit between fellow-citizens as a ground for 
equitable relief are wanting here. The State owns very little of 
the territory alleged to be affected, and the damage to it capable 
of estimate in money, possibly, at least, is small.410 
The Tennessee Copper Court granted equitable relief nonetheless to 
allow Georgia to protect its quasi-sovereign interests in its air and 
its natural resources. Justice Holmes stated that states are entitled 
to special deference in defending their quasi-sovereign interests: 
If the State has a case at all, it is somewhat more certainly 
entitled to specific relief than a private party might be. It is not 
lightly to be required to give up quasi-sovereign rights for pay; 
and, apart from the difficulty of valuing such rights in money, if 
406. Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208,241 (1901). 
407. See supra Part IILA.3. 
408. See supra Part III.A.3. 
409. Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1465 (2007) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); supra 
note 183 and accompanying text. 
410. Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907). 
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that be its choice it may insist that an infraction of them shall 
be stopped. The States by entering the Union did not sink to the 
position of private owners subject to one system of private law. 
This court has not quite the same freedom to balance the harm 
that will be done by an injunction against that of which the 
plaintiff complains, that it would have in deciding between two 
subjects of a single political power.411 
1777 
The Tennessee Copper Court concluded that a state as a quasi-
sovereign could demand equitable relieffrom pollution that affected 
many of its citizens even if individuals could not sue: 
It is a fair and reasonable demand on the part of a sovereign 
that the air over its territory should not be polluted on a great 
scale by sulphurous acid gas, that the forests on its mountains, 
be they better or worse, and whatever domestic destruction they 
have suffered, should not be further destroyed or threatened by 
the act of persons beyond its control, that the crops and orchards 
on its hills should not be endangered from the same source. If 
any such demand is to be enforced this must be, notwithstanding 
the hesitation that we might feel if the suit were between 
private parties, and the doubt whether for the injuries which 
they might be suffering to their property they should not be left 
to an action at law.412 
Because remedies and redressability are intertwined concepts, the 
Tennessee Copper decision's preferential treatment of remedies for 
states strongly supports relaxing the normal redressability 
requirements for states. 
Justice Holmes' broad language supports the approach taken in 
Massachusetts that states are entitled to greater redress in federal 
court than individuals when they are protecting quasi-sovereign 
interests, and broadly supports the principle that states need 
greater standing rights to protect such quasi-sovereign interests. A 
weakness of Justice Holmes' opinion is that he never defines how 
much extra deference should be given to states compared to private 
individuals. Probably the Tennessee Copper Court believed that it 
would have to assess on a case-by-case basis how much additional 
411. Id. at 237-38. 
412. Id. at 238. 
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deference to give to states regarding judicial remedies. The 
inexactitude of the Tennessee Copper decision about how much 
additional deference states deserve compared to individuals leads 
to the same problem in Massachusetts, where the modern Court 
relies on Tennessee Copper but never provides any additional 
guidance on how much extra deference states deserve when courts 
determine standing rights. 
Read together, the Missouri and Tennessee Copper decisions 
support relaxing the immediacy and redressability portions of the 
modern standing test. These are the same two parts of the standing 
test that footnote seven in Lujan recognized should be relaxed for 
procedural rights plaintiffs.413 Accordingly, it makes sense to define 
Massachusetts' special solicitude for state plaintiffs test in light of 
footnote seven's more established jurisprudence. A significant 
difference is that states would enjoy relaxed standing even when 
they bring substantive claims. Many of the Court's parens patriae 
cases were substantive claims, including the public nuisance issues 
in Missouri and Tennessee Copper. 
A more radical approach would be to abolish standing require-
ments for states whenever they assert quasi-sovereign interests in 
a parens patriae suit.414 Although he believes that states should 
have to meet Article III standing in federal courts, Professor Merrill 
concedes: ''There is no suggestion from the Supreme Court's original 
jurisdiction cases adjudicating transboundary nuisance disputes-
the paradigm for the modern parens patriae action-that the States 
bringing these suits were required to meet any particular standing 
burden in order to maintain the action."415 Professors Woolhandler 
and Collins, however, believe that at least some of the Court's early 
parens patriae decisions required states to demonstrate "an interest 
independent of [their] citzens," although they concede "that inde-
pendent interest often seems attenuated."416 The Snapp decision 
implied that Article III limits the concept of quasi-sovereign 
interests, but also provided a very broad definition of those 
413. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 572 n.7 (1992). 
414. WELLS ET AL., supra note 189, at 38-39 (suggesting that a state's quasi-sovereign 
interest alone is sufficient for standing). 
415. Merrill, supra note 5, at 305. 
416. Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 361, at 511. 
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interests.417 Abolishing standing requirements for states in parens 
patriae suits would simplify such cases by eliminating the need to 
address difficult standing issues such as injury, causation, and 
redressability. The Massachusetts decision implicitly assumed that 
states must meet some standing requirements. 418 It is unlikely that 
the Court meant to abolish standing for states even if eliminating 
all standing requirements would simplify the task left to lower 
courts. 
The Massachusetts decision implied that states in parens patriae 
suits are entitled to more lenient standing requirements. 419 Footnote 
seven standing is the only existing example in which the Court has 
adopted more lenient standing requirements, and therefore would 
appear to be a logical starting point for inferring what the 
Massachusetts majority had in mind when it concluded that states 
are entitled to lower standing requirements.42o One problem with 
using footnote seven standing as an analogy for state standing is 
that the Court has never fully defined the contours of the former 
standing test. In light of the special solicitude that Massachusetts 
gave to state standing in parens patriae cases, courts should 
generally follow those lower court decisions that have liberally 
interpreted footnote seven standing. For example, in state parens 
patriae standing cases, courts should follow the Ninth Circuit's rule 
that footnote seven plaintiffs "need only establish 'the reasonable 
probability of the challenged action's threat to [their] concrete 
interest'" rather than the D.C. Circuit's more restrictive four-part 
test requiring a procedural rights plaintiff to demonstrate that it 
is "substantially probable" that the agency action will cause a 
demonstrable injury to a particularized interest of the plaintiff.421 
Judge Sentelle concluded that the petitioners in Massachusetts 
could not meet the standing requirements even under the relaxed 
standing test for procedural rights plaintiffs because he followed 
417. Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rei. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 602 (1982) 
("Formulated so broadly, the concept [of a quasi-sovereign interest] risks being too vague to 
survive the standing requirements of Art. III: A quasi-sovereign interest must be sufficiently 
concrete to create an actual controversy between the State and the defendant."); Merrill, 
supra note 5, at 304. 
418. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1454-55 (2007) (majority opinion). 
419. See id. 
420. See supra Part III.A.2. 
421. See supra note 91. 
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the D.C. Circuit's more restrictive test.422 In light of the Supreme 
Court's rejection of Judge Sentelle's approach to standing in 
Massachusetts, it is more likely that the majority of the Court would 
have followed the Ninth Circuit's more liberal approach to standing. 
VI. POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
The relaxed standing rule for states in Massachusetts will make 
it easier for states and state attorneys general (AGs) to file suit in 
federal courts.423 State AGs generally possess a "monopoly, or a near 
monopoly, on the state executive branch's access to the courtroom," 
although the governor or state legislature may have some influence 
through legal, budgetary, or political intervention.424 Decisions that 
recognize that states have broad authority to file parens patriae 
suits generally expand the power of state AGs to file lawsuits.425 
The Massachusetts decision will encourage states and state AGs to 
file suits against the federal government in particular, although 
several lower court decisions had already allowed such suits.426 
Additionally, states and state AGs may file more parens patriae 
suits in general, including mass tort claims, consumer protection 
suits, or natural resource damages claims.427 
422. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d 50,59-60 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (Sentelle, J., dissenting 
in part and concurring in judgment) (citing Fla. Audubon Soc'y v. Bentsen, 94 F.3d 658 (D.C. 
Cir. 1996», rev'd, 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007). 
423. See Stevenson, supra note 3, at 38; Watts & Wildermuth, supra note 4 (manuscript 
at 8) ("The more lenient Lujan-lite analysis that courts apparently are now to apply when 
states assert a quasi-sovereign interest may well give states a strategic incentive to assert 
quasi-sovereign interests, even though the analysis will still turn on their proprietary 
interests."). See generally Richard Blumenthal, The Role of State Attorneys General, 33 CONN. 
L. REV. 1207 (2001); Roundtable: State Attorney General Litigation: Regulation Through 
Litigation and the Separation of Powers, 31 SETON HALL L. REV. 617 (2001) [hereinafter 
Roundtable]; Symposium, The Role of State Attorneys General in National Environmental 
Policy, 30 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 335 (2005). 
424. Timothy Meyer, Comment, Federalism and Accountability: State Attorneys General, 
Regulatory Litigation, and the New Federalism, 95 CAL. L. REV. 885, 890-95 (2007). 
425. See Ieyoub & Eisenberg, supra note 344, at 1875-76 (arguing broad parens patriae 
doctrine leads to more suits by state AGs); Kanner, supra note 344, at 112-15. 
426. See supra note 386 and accompanying text. 
427. See Ieyoub & Eisenberg, supra note 344, at 1875-83 (arguing broad parens patriae 
doctrine leads to more mass tort and consumer protection suits by state AGs, including suits 
against the tobacco industry); Kanner, supra note 344, at 107-15 (arguing broad parens 
patriae doctrine leads to more natural resource damages suits by state AGs). 
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A parens patriae suit by a state AG is often a more effective way 
to protect the public interest of state residents than individual suits 
by private individuals, including suits against the federal 
government.428 A state in a parens patriae suit may be able to secure 
broader relief and represent a broader range of interests than a suit 
by individuals, even if those individuals file a class action.429 
Traditionally, public nuisance suits by government officials were 
accorded presumptive validity by courts and therefore were subject 
to lesser standing-like requirements than private nuisance suits, 
in which individual plaintiffs had to prove special injury.43o In 
Tennessee Copper, Justice Holmes provided broad equitable relief to 
Georgia that was unavailable to private litigants, and stated that 
the Court weighed the equities in granting injunctive relief to a 
state to protect its quasi-sovereign interest in its natural resources 
differently than if two private individuals were involved in a suit.431 
In Massachusetts, it is unclear whether the Court would have been 
willing to allow private individuals to secure the same relief against 
the EPA that the Court granted to Massachusetts. 
Additionally, it is generally less costly for the state AG to file one 
lawsuit than for dozens of private individuals to file suit, although 
the cost of private suits may be reduced if they are filed as a class 
action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 or by an orga-
nization representing a large number ofmembers.432 In some cases, 
428. See Comment, supra note 203, at 1101 ("A state could thereby mobilize its powerful 
legal resources, including ample funding and staffing, on behalf of its citizens when they are 
harmed by federal agency action, rather than let the burden fall upon individual injured 
parties whose resources may be inadequate for the task."). 
429. See id. at 1103·09 (comparing parens patriae suits with class action suits and arguing 
that parens patriae suits have several advantages). 
430. See David R. Hodas, Private Actions for Public Nuisance: Common Law Citizen Suits 
for Relief from Environmental Harm, 16 ECOLOGY L.Q. 883, 883·84 (1989); Merrill, supra note 
5, at 301 & n.35. 
431. Georgia v. Tenn. Copper, 206 U.S. 230, 237·38 (1907); supra text accompanying notes 
15,21. 
432. See generally Kanner, supra note 344, at 112·15 (stressing the efficiency of suits by 
state AGs); Comment, supra note 203, at 1103·09 (comparing parens patriae suits with class 
action suits and arguing that parens patriae suits have several advantages). But see FALLON 
ET AL., supra note 403, at 292 ("Is the state a better or worse representative of others than, 
for example, a class representative under Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 23, or an organizational plaintiff 
suing on behalf of its members?"). One potential disadvantage of parens patriae suits is that 
they will ordinarily preclude separate claims by citizens who were represented by the state. 
[d. 
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state AGs have controversially contracted with private attorneys on 
either an hourly fee or contingent fee basis to file suit if the state 
AG lacks the resources or expertise to file a particular type of suit. 433 
There was controversy in litigation involving the tobacco industry 
about the size of the contingency fees and the secrecy in some states 
about the size of the fees and how the AG selected the private 
attorneys.434 For example, Minnesota Attorney General Humphrey 
stated that his office lacked sufficient attorneys and expertise in 
civil litigation to sue the tobacco industry without the assistance of 
private attorneys that his office hired.435 
A state AG can also ally with her colleagues in other states to 
reduce costs or to increase the level oflegal or technical expertise for 
the plaintiffs, as in the Massachusetts litigation, where twelve state 
AGs joined as petitioners.436 For instance, Connecticut Attorney 
General Richard Blumenthal has observed that it is helpful to have 
California and New York as allies in global warming cases because 
they are large states with ''huge resources.,,437 There can be conflicts 
among states about which states will take the lead role in the 
case, but sometimes those issues can be resolved by choosing the 
state that has the strongest factual case. In Massachusetts, the 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts took the lead role in the case 
because its long coastline presented the best factual case for 
showing harm from global warming.438 
433. See Kanner, supra note 344, at 113·14 (encouraging state AGs to hire private 
attorneys on a contingency fee basis to reduce costs to the public). 
434. See Roundtable, supra note 423, at 621-22 (remarks of Alabama Attorney General 
William H. Pryor, Jr.) (discussing controversy about size of attorneys' fees and secrecy by 
some state AGs in negotiating fees and hiring private attorneys in litigation challenging 
marketing practices of the tobacco industry); see also Mark A. Behrens & Donald Kochan, Let 
the Sunshine In: The Need for Open, Competitive Bidding in Government Retention of Private 
Legal Services, PROD. SAFETY & LIAB. REP., Oct. 2, 2000, at 915. Some states have enacted 
legislation to regulate the fees that the state attorney general may negotiate with private 
lawyers. See, e.g., Kan. H.B. 2627 (2000); N.D. CENT. CODE. § 54-12-08.1 (1999); TEX. Gov'T 
CODE ANN. § 404.097 (Vernon 1999); Roundtable, supra note 423, at 622 n.10. 
435. See Roundtable, supra note 423, at 622-23 (remarks of Minnesota Attorney General 
Humphrey). 
436. See Stevenson, supra note 3, at 12, 37-50 (discussing the trend since the 1980s for 
state AGs to cooperate and collaborate in lawsuits); Meyer, supra note 424, at 903-07 
(discussing cooperation of state AGs in tobacco litigation and other cases). 
437. Symposium, supra note 423, at 346 (remarks of Connecticut Attorney General Richard 
Blumenthal). 
438. See Stevenson, supra note 3, at 12-13. 
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There could be negative political or policy consequences from 
parens patriae suits if state AGs abuse their authority by filing 
frivolous or burdensome suits, although Rule 11 sanctions should 
limit inappropriate actions.439 Of course, private parties sometimes 
also file frivolous or burdensome suits, and thus state AGs are not 
the only lawyers who might file questionable lawsuits. There is a 
danger that state AGs will file lawsuits for political reasons because 
state AGs are elected positions in forty-three states.440 Accordingly, 
state AGs "are political figures with political agendas and political 
aspirations [and] [t]heir litigation decisions often reflect their 
political interests .... "441 Professor Cass observes, "It should come as 
no surprise that eleven of the twelve attorneys general suing in 
Mass. v. EPA were Democrats while the administration whose 
policies they challenged was Republican."442 By increasing the 
importance of the state AGs, the easy availability of parens patriae 
suits might lead to more political competition to become the state 
AG and might make the office more partisan.443 Such political 
competition might have positive impacts by improving the quality 
of candidates, but also could have negative effects if sitting state 
AGs file suits for political reasons, or if candidates pander for votes 
by promising to file questionable suits if they are elected.444 
Industries that are potential or actual defendants might get in-
volved in AG elections to defeat candidates who might sue them or 
to elect candidates who may be more favorable to their interests.445 
Because special interests often have more incentive to lobby the 
439. See FED. R. CIV. P. l1(c} (authorizing courts to impose sanctions against parties or 
attorneys filing frivolous law suits). See generally HANs BADER, COMPARATIVE ENTERPRISE 
INST., THE NATION'S TOp TEN WORST STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL 22 (Jan. 24, 2007), available 
at http://www. cei.org/pdfl5719.pdf (criticizing ten state attorneys general for using "lawsuits 
as a weapon by which to impose new regulations on the public"); infra note 452 and 
accompanying text. 
440. Stevenson, supra note 3, at 10; Meyer, supra note 424, at 895-96 (arguing that state 
AGs may alter decisions to increase opportunities for higher office). 
441. Ronald A. Cass, Massachusetts v. EPA.- The Inconvenient Truth About Precedent, 93 
VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 75, 78-79 (2007), available at http://www.virginialawreview.org/inbriefl 
2007/05/21/cass. pdf. 
442. Id. at 79. 
443. See Stevenson, supra note 3, at 10-12. 
444. See id. at 10-12, 40-41, 46 n.233. 
445. See Kanner, supra note 344, at 114 (observing that a new AG may drop a lawsuit it 
disagrees with); Stevenson, supra note 3, at 42 (predicting more "lobbyist efforts focused on 
these national policy issues ... at the state AG's office"). 
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government than average citizens, there is a possibility that states 
or state AGs will file suits that serve those interests more than the 
interests of the state's citizens.446 Additionally, in some circum-
stances, a group of some state AGs may be able to reach a national 
settlement with a particular industry or set of defendants that does 
not reflect the will of citizens in other states.447 
Conversely, there are reasons to believe that state AGs will 
generally use their authority to file parens patriae suits in a 
responsible way. State AGs must respond to a broad range of 
constituents and therefore have an incentive to serve the public 
interest.448 There could be some public benefits from increased 
public discussion of important national policy issues if candidates 
for the AG position address potential areas of litigation that they 
plan to bring if they are elected.449 The increased importance of the 
state AG position could bring stronger candidates for that office.450 
Because lawsuits often last for many years and outlast the term of 
a particular state AG, career civil servants, including attorneys in 
the AG's office, might be able, in some circumstances, to influence 
their politically elected superior to maintain suits that a new AG 
might not have filed in the first instance.451 Finally, the federal 
courts can dismiss frivolous suits and even impose sanctions under 
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure if a state AG files an 
446. See generally Steven P. Croley, Theories of Regulation: Incorporating the 
Administrative Process, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1998) (discussing four competing theories of 
whether government bureaucracies act on behalf of public interest, special interests, or 
government employees' self-interests, and concluding, "regulatory outcomes ameliorate 
market failures and vindicate the citizenry's interests ... more commonly than other scholars 
of regulation acknowledge .... "); Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, The Jurisprudence of 
Public Choice, 65 TEX. L. REV. 873 (1987) (discussing "public choice" theory that postulates 
that special interest groups will have greater incentive to lobby and influence legislative 
actions, and arguing that legislatures act on behalf of public interest more often than public 
choice theory would predict); Sean Gailmard, Expertise, Subversion, and Bureaucratic 
Discretion, 18 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 536, 537 (2002) (discussing the problem of bureaucracies 
acting contrary to legislative intent); Michael E. Levine & Jennifer L. Forrence, Regulatory 
Capture, Public Interest, and the Public Agenda: Toward a Synthesis, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 167, 
169 (1990) (discussing theory that special interests can "capture" regulatory agencies). 
447. Meyer, supra note 424, at 886-87,909-14. 
448. See Stevenson, supra note 3, at 14. 
449. Id. at 12. 
450. Id. at 41-43. 
451. Kanner, supra note 344, at 114. 
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abusive parens patriae action.452 Thus, most parens patriae suits 
should serve the public interest. 
CONCLUSION 
The Massachusetts decision announced a new rule of law that 
gives states preferential standing when they sue to protect their 
quasi-sovereign interest in the health and welfare of their citizens 
or the state's natural resources.453 Yet this new rule has a sound 
basis in the Court's parens patriae decisions, even though those 
cases generally do not explicitly address standing issues.454 Because 
quasi-sovereign interests normally involve generalized grievances 
applicable to large numbers of people or to extensive natural 
resources, courts should not require states to demonstrate the type 
of particularized injuries that private plaintiffs are required to 
demonstrate for standing.455 For example, both the Missouri and 
Tennessee Copper cases were public nuisance suits addressing 
generalized injuries to large numbers of people or territories, but 
the Court in those cases did not require the plaintiff state to show 
that it had an individual injury because quasi-sovereign interests 
are different in kind from individual rights. 456 Accordingly, 
Massachusetts appropriately relied on the Court's parens patriae 
decisions as the grounds for giving states greater standing rights 
when they sue on behalf of quasi-sovereign interests, although none 
452. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c) (authorizing courts to impose sanctions against parties or 
attorneys filing frivolous law suits); Derechin v. State Univ. of N.Y., 963 F.2d 513, 519-20 (2d 
Cir. 1992) (affirming district court's imposition of Rule 11 sanctions against New York State 
Assistant Attorney General and order prohibiting the lawyer from receiving indemnification 
available under New York law); Henderson v. Dep't of Pub. Safety & Corr., 901 F.2d 1288, 
1296-97 (5th Cir. 1990) (affirming district court's imposition of Rule 11 sanctions against 
Louisiana State Assistant Attorney General). But see Connecticut v. Borjorquez, 967 F.2d 
1418, 1421 (9th Cir. 1992) (vacating district court's order reprimanding Arizona State 
Assistant Attorney General under Rule 11 for filing a frivolous motion because the district 
court abused its discretion, and because appellant's motion was soundly based in fact and law, 
and was not filed for the purpose of delay); Gilmore v. Finn, 259 Va. 448, 527 S.E.2d 426 
(2000) (reversing as abuse of discretion the trial court's award of attorney's fees and sanctions 
against the Governor of Virginia for filing suit in a right-to· die case because the Governor's 
suit was not baseless or frivolous-rejecting trial court's findings to that effect). 
453. See supra Part III.A.2. 
454. See supra Part IV.G. 
455. See supra Part I.B. 
456. See supra Part IV.B. 
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of those earlier cases had explicitly applied a different standing test 
for states.457 
A serious weakness of the Massachusetts decision is that it fails 
to define to what extent and under what circumstances federal 
courts should apply more relaxed standing requirements for 
states.458 The Missouri and Tennessee Copper decisions provide 
helpful insights about how modern courts should address standing 
issues in parens patriae cases, even though neither case was about 
standing. The Missouri decision considered the future health 
impacts of the water pollution in that case and, by analogy, supports 
relaxing the immediacy requirement of standing so that, for 
example, Massachusetts should be able to include projections 
from computer models about the effects of global warming on its 
coastline through 2100.459 The Tennessee Copper decision gave states 
equitable remedies that were unavailable to private litigants and 
did not require Georgia to explain the precise impacts of injunctive 
relief. 460 By analogy, Tennessee Copper supports relaxing the 
redressability requirements for states so that, for example, 
Massachusetts does not have to prove how much the EPA's 
regulation of new vehicle emissions would reduce future harms to 
its coastline, as long as it is likely that such regulation would reduce 
the harm to the state.461 
Similar to procedural rights cases, the Supreme Court should 
apply more lenient immediacy and redressability requirements 
when states sue to protect quasi-sovereign interests.462 Thus, even 
if Professor Adler is correct that the Massachusetts Court was wrong 
when it applied the footnote seven analysis to a case that ultimately 
required a substantive decision by the EPA, the Court was right to 
apply more relaxed immediacy and redressability requirements 
because Massachusetts was protecting its quasi-sovereign interest 
457. See supra note 313 and accompanying text. 
458. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1466 (2007) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) ("It 
is not at all clear how the Court's 'special solicitude' for Massachusetts plays out in the 
standing analysis, except as an implicit concession that petitioners cannot establish standing 
on traditional terms."). 
459. See supra notes 405·06 and accompanying text. 
460. See supra notes 409·12 and accompanying text. 
461. See supra notes 343·47 and accompanying text. 
462. See supra Part I.C. 
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in its coastline.463 The Akins decision suggests an appropriate outer 
limit to parens patriae cases and special solicitude for state 
standing by requiring proof of some type of concrete injury when a 
plaintiff seeks relief for generalized injuries that apply to the public 
at large.464 Because the loss of Massachusetts' coastline is far from 
trivial and the proposed remedy oflimiting emissions from new U.S. 
vehicles would reduce the amount of harm, the Court appropriately 
granted standing to Massachusetts.465 
463. See supra Part III.C.2. 
464. See supra Part I.B. 
465. See supra Part III.C.3. 
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